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ABSTRACT
Networks are designed with functionality, security, performance, and cost in mind.
Flows should be served while controlling risk due to attackers. Configuration is time
intensive and largely static until a major new vulnerability or service requirement
forces change. We address this problem with an autonomous framework consisting
of Observe, Orient, Decide and Act phases and look to optimization techniques for
solutions to the Orient and Decide phases.
Our first solution explores opportunities to improve network Quality of Service
by combining a single flow routing solutions with a global multi-flow solution in a
hybrid manner. In order to evaluate the quality of our solutions we implement an
autonomous framework which generates the routing solution in a software defined
network.
We then explore two additional solutions that address both functional and security
requirements and explore the trade-off of modeling and implementation choices for
this problem. These two solutions innovate in modeling security risk in a way that
is amenable to optimization and in the evaluation of the quality of the resulting
configurations.
Devon M. Callahan,
University of Connecticut, 2020
Our framework allows an enterprise to automatically reconfigure their network
upon a change in functionality (shift in user demand) or security (publication or
patching of a vulnerability).
The primary contributions of this work are two-fold: 1) the formulation and in-
tegrations of methods to address network Quality of Service and security in an au-
tonomous framework and 2) detailed evaluation of these methods combining both
emulation and simulation.
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Network administrators must balance functionality, performance, security, cost and
other industry specific requirements. Implementation of this vision becomes complex
when considering that priorities are often antagonistic. An an improvement of one
property may negatively impact another. Striking the appropriate balance between
opposing requirements is complex. In order for our networks to be responsive to user
demands and resilient to threats they must be able to strike this balance quickly.
Tools assist administrators with this complex task: existing work assesses net-
work reachability [65], wireless conflicts [90], network security risk [106, 126], and
load balancing [114, 122]. These tools assess the quality of a potential configuration.
Unfortunately, current tools suffer from three limitations:
1. Tools assess whether a single property is satisfied, making no recommendation if
the property is not satisfied. This leaves IT personnel with the task of deciding
how to change the network.
2. Tools assess networks with respect to an individual goal at a time. This means
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a change to satisfy a single property may break another property. There is no
guidance for personnel on how to design a network that meets the complex and
often conflicting network requirements.
3. Tools do not react to changing external information such as the publication of
a new security vulnerability.
A more desirable scenario is a highly integrated and flexible system, providing
solutions that meet all possible requirements with the ability to rapidly apply those
solutions. We address this problem with a autonomous solution consisting of Observe,
Orient, Decide and Act phases and look to optimization techniques for solutions to
the Orient and Decide phases.
Our first solution explores opportunities to improve network Quality of Service
by combining current single flow routing solutions with a global multi-flow solution
in a hybrid manner. In order to evaluate the quality of our solutions we implement
a autonomous framework that generates benchmarks for input to our Hybrid solver.
The framework generates an SDN network from the description in the benchmark,
translates the high-level model solutions into routable Openflow tables, and evaluate
the resulting configuration with IPv4 traffic.
We then explore two additional solutions that address both functional and security
requirements and explore the trade-off of modeling and implementation choices for
this problem. These two solutions innovate in modeling security risk in a way that
is amenable to optimization and in the evaluation of the quality of the resulting
configurations.
The network configuration problem is difficult, networks are large and must be
updated quickly. Our approach has the most promise for software-defined networks
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which can easily change their logical configuration. Our framework allows an enter-
prise to automatically reconfigure their network upon a change in functionality (shift
in user demand) or security (publication or patching of a vulnerability). The primary
contributions of this work are two-fold: 1) the formulation and integrations of methods
to address network Quality of Service and security in a autonomous framework and
2) detailed evaluation of these methods combining both emulation and simulation.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Autonomous Networking
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) is a decision making framework created by
COL William Boyd of USAF in the 1987 to explain combat effectiveness of air to air
combat during the Korean War [21]. We use this framework and apply the principals
of autonomic computing: self configuration, healing, optimization and protection [63]
to our network problem. Other frameworks exist. MAPE-K (Monitor, Analyze,
Plan, Execute and Knowledge) is a reference architecture in use by IBM in the field
of autonomic computing [31]. We choose to use OODA framework for our discussion
throughout based on its wide spread application in command and control systems
beyond autonomous networking.
1.1.2 Data Center Networks
Data Center Networks (DCN) host, process and analyze data in financial, entertain-
ment, medical, government and military sectors. The services provided by DCNs must
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be reliable, accurate and timely. Services provided by DCNs (and the correspond-
ing traffic) are heterogeneous [84]. The network must adapt to changing priorities
and requirements while protecting from emerging threats. They scale to thousands of
servers linked through various interconnects. Protocols used for these services are split
roughly 60 percent web (HTTP/HTPS) and 40 percent file storage (SMB/AFS) [17].
The interdependence of device configurations make modifying any single configura-
tion difficult and possibly dangerous for network health. A seemingly simple update
can cause significant collateral damage and unintended consequences [69].
1.1.3 Software Defined Networks
The network fabric is changing with the advent of Software Defined Networking
(SDN) [70]. SDNs separate the control logic from the data forwarding which is inte-
grated in traditional networks. SDN provides a control plane which is administered
by a network controller and a separate forwarding plane which resides on the switches
and routers. SDNs are flexible and programmable networks that can adapt to emer-
gent functional or performance requirements. Openflow [83] is a common open source
software stack used to communicate between SDN controllers and SDN enabled de-
vices (switches and routers). Unfortunately, Openflow is 1) a relatively low level
language requiring multiple rules to implement simple concepts 2) difficult to ensure
correct application of policies from different modules (routing, access control) [44]
Researchers have proposed high-level languages and compilers [15, 44, 66, 101] that
bridge the semantic gap between network administrators and the configuration lan-
guages used by SDN devices. These languages focus on compositional and parametric
SDN software modules that execute specific micro-functions (e.g., packet forwarding,
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dropping, routing, etc.). The use of a high level language is prompted by a desire to
be able to select, instantiate and compose SDN modules with guarantees.
1.2 Overview of Technical Works
1.2.1 Chapter 3 GOSH
In Chapter 3 we introduce a framework GOSH - Global Optimization in Software-
defined networks a Hybrid approach. This framework is designed to improve network
QoS by combining techniques from DCN and backbone networking fields. The major-
ity of QoS routing solutions in DCN networks are solved in an online manner solving
single flow requests [18]. This approach has the benefit of being fast (msec) but with
the possible loss of accuracy. Conversely in internet backbone routing there are of-
fline approaches that solve for multiple flows that are slower (seconds-minutes) but
provide global optimality [26,119,125].
We combine the above single flow and multi flow strategies, using single flow
solutions to route emerging demand and periodically implementing multi-flow solution
to ensure that the quality of service in the network does not degrade significantly
over time. We develop an autonomous framework using Mininet, an SDN emulation
platform, to deploy and to evaluate the feasibility of this approach and the quality of
our solutions.
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1.2.2 Chapter 4 DocSDN
This work introduces a new optimization framework that finds network configurations
that satisfy multiple (conflicting) requirements. Our framework is called DocSDN
(Dynamic and Optimal Configuration of Software-Defined Networks). DocSDN
searches for network configurations that simultaneously satisfy functionality and se-
curity requirements. DocSDN is organized into layers that consider different prop-
erties. The core of DocSDN is a multistage optimization that decouples search on
“orthogonal” concerns. The majority of the technical work is to effectively separate
concerns so the optimization problems remain tractable.
1.2.3 Chapter 5 Fashion
In Chapter 5 we develop an optimization framework we call Fashion (Functional
and Attack graph Secured HybrId Optimization of virtualized Networks). Similar to
the work in the previous chapter Fashion considers both functionality and security
in developing network configurations. The functional layer treats network traffic
as a multi-commodity data flow problem and provides the logic to route flows. To
evaluate risk we use Attack Graphs and develop an approximation of a prior measure
described by Wang et al. [121] that is amenable to quick evaluation using integer linear
programming. The security layer then integrates the risk of a configuration to create
a joint model between the two layers. This work differs from the work presented in
Chapter 4 in that Fashion’s risk model, through the use of Attack Graphs accounts
for an adversary’s ability to pivot in the network. In DocSDN each node assumes a
fraction of the risk of any node with which they share a path.
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1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:I n Chapter 2 we provide details common
to all evaluations, In Chapter 3, we look a improving network QoS by combining
techniques from DCN and backbone networking fields. In Chapter 4, we discuss the
benefits and the challenges of integrating security and functionality models to solve
the network configuration problem. In Chapter 5 we implement a combined module
for functionality and security with innovations of security risk modeling.
1.4 Publications
Conference papers that are accepted and published with primary authorship include:
1. [25] D. Callahan, P. Shakarian, J. Nielsen, and A. N. Johnson, “Shaping
operations to attack robust terror networks,” in 2012 International Conference
on Social Informatics. IEEE, 2012, pp. 13–18.
2. [33] T. Curry, D. Callahan, B. Fuller, and L. Michel, “Docsdn: Dynamic and
optimal configuration of software-defined networks,” in Australasian Conference
on Information Security and Privacy. Springer, 2019, pp. 456–474.
Currently submitted conference papers with primary authorship include
3. [24] D. Callahan, T. Curry, D. Davidson, H. Zitoun, B. Fuller, and L. Michel,
“Fashion: Functional and attack graph secured hybrid optimization of virtual-
ized networks,” ESORICS, 2020.
4. D. Callahan, T. Curry, D. Davidson, H. Zitoun, B. Fuller, and L. Michel,
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“Gosh - Global Optimization in Software-defined networks a Hybrid approach,”
IEEE INFOCOM , 2021
Conference papers that are accepted and published with co-authorship include:
5. [109] P. Shakarian, P. Roos, D. Callahan, and C. Kirk, “Mining for ge-
ographically disperse communities in social networks by leveraging distance
modularity,” in Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGKDD International Con-
ference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, ser. KDD ’13. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp. 1402–1409. [Online]. Available: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/2487575.2488194
6. [110] P. Shakarian, G. I. Simari, and D. Callahan, “Reasoning about com-
plex networks: a logic programming approach,” MILITARY ACADEMY WEST




To the best of our knowledge, no standard benchmarks for evaluation of network
Functionality and Security solutions exist. For the purpose of this research, we created
a benchmark suite with over 600 instances that models a data center topology, its
traffic patterns and utilization rates, along with a realistic representation of dispersed
network vulnerabilities. The elements of our evaluation topology and benchmark
generation common to all chapters follows. Descriptions found in separate chapters
are specific to that chapter.
2.1 Topology
A fundamental component of our work is the separation of the physical and logical
networks. Our framework has potential in applications where many different logical
topologies are possible from a single physical topology. The true benefits of com-
bining constraint programming with SDN is realized on the logical routing topology.
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Figure 2.1: Order 4 Fat-tree with 2 gateway switches at the top and 2 hosts per edge
switch.
The physical network is still very much relevant to solving this problem as it pro-
vides us with the set of possibilities. We assume that the physical network is static,
composed of possibly miles of cabling connecting layers of networking devices across
networks contained in a single room to spanning the globe. The design considerations
of these physical networks is important and can greatly improve network performance
if properly engineered but is not the focus of our work.
Physical topology is an input to our framework and the empirical evaluation is
based on a popular topology: Fat-Tree [5]. An example instance of Fat-Tree we use is
shown in Figure 2.1. The network design avoids bottlenecks through multiple equal
capacity links between layers thus not necessitating expensive aggregation and core
switches. This design uses four layers of switches: gateway, core, aggregate and edge.
The edge switches serve as top-of-rack switches and are where our hosts connect. A
k-port switch yields an order k Fat-Tree with k pods and k switches per pod. The
resulting topology provides multiple equal cost paths between hosts.
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2.2 Traffic
The network demand module defaults to the traffic pattern described in the recent
Global Cloud Index (GCI) report [28] which provides breakdown of data center traffic
seen globally. The benchmarks that we generated contain 70% internal traffic and
30% external traffic. To generate internal traffic, pairs of hosts are selected randomly
until the number of desired flows is reached, we do not allow repeated pairs. Our
benchmarks all contain bi-directional traffic, so for every pair of hosts selected (i, j)
for a new demand pairing, we also generate a demand in the reverse (j, i) order.
We model external demand by creating a single external source. This external
source is connected to the gateway device and acts as a source/sink for all external
traffic. Then each external demand is generated by selecting a single internal host
and pairing it with the external source. The external host is not considered regarding
capacity constraints for solving or evaluating the model.
Demand is considered constant and measured in the number of Mbps that is
required between the source and destination. Research shows that there exists heavy-
tailed distributions for the volume and size of data flows [7]. There are generally small
and large sized flows with 90% of the traffic volume being small and 10% large [132],
our benchmarks follow this distribution, generating small flows between 1-100 Mbps,
and large flows 100-500 Mbps.
The generator has a Traff input parameter, which determines the number of
traffic types generated in the demand. The generator labels each flow with a ran-
dom abstract traffic type from the pool of traffic types which can be later converted
an application layer protocol (HTTP, HTTPS, SMB) or transport layer protocol
(TCP,UDP) depending on the desired evaluation. Concretely, in our evaluation in
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Chapter 3 we map to UDP and TCP using the iperf3 traffic generation tool.
2.3 Benchmark generator
Each benchmark has 2-3 main components. Benchmarks used in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 have a network topology and traffic component. The benchmarks used for
evaluation in Chapter 5 add a Vulnerability component which is discussed in detail in
the related chapter. The following are input parameters for our benchmark generator
relating to the network:
Pods the number of pods in the topology which determines the number of switches
generated.
Speed the port speed of each switch.
Mem the amount of TCAM memory available. TCAM is particularly important for
our evaluation because it can be a limiting factor on the number of flow rules
in each switch routing table.
Direct whether to make links directed or undirected.
Hosts the number of hosts per edge switch in the network.
The following are input parameters for our instance generator relating to the traffic
demand:
Flows the number demand flows per host in the benchmark.
BiDir if this flag is set we duplicate demand pairings in reverse order.
Traff the number of traffic types.
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Network Topology Network Traffic Vulnerabilities
pod Devices Hosts Switch Links #traffic #flows Exploits AG edges
min max min max min max min max
2 10 4 6 9 1 3 8 80 1 10 18 165
4 37 16 21 52 1 3 32 320 1 40 258 2350
6 100 54 46 171 1 3 108 1080 5 108 2928 26463
8 209 128 81 400 1 3 256 2560 12 250 16422 147627
10 376 250 126 775 1 2 500 1500 12 400 62537 250765
12 613 432 181 1332 1 3 866 866 21 105 186682 1677306
Table 2.1: Benchmark data, 649 instances. The number of links represents the number
of bi-directional links in the network. The #traffic column represents the number of
distinct traffic types.
Extrn the percentage of the traffic involving an external host. We use a single
external host as a super-sink for all external traffic.
Add the amount of additional traffic to generate. This is used in our dynamic testing.
For example, in the Fat-tree 4 network there are 16 hosts, setting the input pa-
rameter [Flows] = 1, and setting the [BiDir] flag we have 32 flows ( 16 x 1 fph x 2
bi-dir traffic ). Please see Chapter 5 , for a discussion on Vulnerability generation.
2.4 Benchmarks
A high level breakdown of the benchmark characteristics can be found in Table 2.1.
13
Chapter 3
Functionality - A Hybrid Approach
3.1 Introduction
Traffic Engineering (TE) is the practice of measuring, modeling, and controlling traf-
fic [2]. We focus on optimizing routing functions by directing traffic in the most
“effective” way. Software Defined Networking (SDN) provides the flexibility to opti-
mize routing functions due to the centralized view of the network state and control
of the forwarding policies which were previously decentralized. Thus, leveraging SDN
provides opportunities to improve on existing TE practices.
The focus of this work is responding to changes in network demand, which are
represented as new flows. Our goal is to route these flows in a way that maximizes the
overall quality of service in the network. Optimally utilizing the existing resources
reduces how much the network must be “over-provisioned” to deal with unexpected
demand. To illustrate how traffic can unexpectedly change, consider the shift/growth
of internet traffic during the COVID-19 pandemic. AT&T, one of the largest carriers
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of internet traffic, reported a 25% increase in traffic during the work week from March
to April [42]. This equates to an additional 71 petabytes per day and is more than
their entire traffic load in 2014 (56 petabytes per day).
Most TE techniques to determine route selection for a new flow are incremental.
That is, when a flow arrives, a route is selected for the duration of the flow. Most of
these techniques can be seen as a variant of a Weighted Constrained Shortest Path
(CSP) problem [18]. The variety in techniques can be largely expressed as differences
in constraints and the objective. For example, edge weights can be based on physical
limitations such as distance and propagation delay [118], or current network states
such as congestion [37], current flow satisfaction ratios [77] and packet loss on links
[124]. These works can be split into heuristic approaches [6, 47, 71] and optimization
approaches that provide formal guarantees [74] [127] [37].
At first glance, it seems that any routing decision mechanism must operate on a
single flow at a time and must be very fast (taking at most milliseconds). However,
this raises two primary questions:
1. How much waste results in routing flows individually?
2. Does the emergence of SDN provide an opportunity to supplement this approach
with a multi-flow routing approach?
In the Internet backbone, these are solutions that optimize multiple flows simultane-
ously [26, 119, 125]. These solutions are highly tailored to Internet Backbone imple-
mentations which have fewer nodes and QoS metrics are based on static properties
such as geographic separation.
15
Figure 3.1: Integration of a Single Flow Solver and Multi-Flow Solver in a SDN
Application
3.1.1 Our Contribution
We combine the above single flow and multi flow strategies, leveraging the strength of
each to offset the inherent weakness of the other. Such an approach is complementary
to routing flows as they arrive. Our approach is called GOSH for Global Optimization
in Software-defined networks, a Hybrid approach. GOSH consists of the following 3
components:
1. Use single-flow route selection as new flows arrive (Figure 3.2a) ,
2. Once a set of k single-flows have arrived recompute a multi-flow optimum,
3. If this new multi-flow optimum improves on the single-flow solution by “enough,”
deploy this multi-flow optimum (Figure 3.2b).
This approach, depicted in Figure 3.1, provides the flexibility of quickly solving
individual flows as they arrive, while also leveraging current optimization technolo-
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gies to ensure that the quality of service in the network does not degrade significantly
over time. Moreover, by delaying a global routing update until the point when quality
of service can be significantly improved, we avoid an over-engineering of the network
routing which would perhaps negatively impact the network’s functionality more than
a sub-optimal routing configuration would. Traffic patterns may emerge over time
identifying certain flows as more long term due to the service they provide such as
VoIP or video streaming. We naturally want to wait to perform any global optimiza-
tion until such a time as these long term flows emerge.
In this work, we show the promise of this approach by:
1. Proposing a mixed integer programming model, denoted Gos (Global Optimiza-
tion Solver), and combining it in a Hybrid (GOSH) manner with an existing
single flow solver, SP (Shortest Path).
2. Evaluating GOSH using TCP traffic in an emulated OpenFlow Network using
Mininet [73].
SP acts as our single flow solver and generates the shortest paths between all
possible pairs in the graph [108]. In our framework, SP handles all route selection for
immediate routing until we generate and implement a global solution with Gos. The
novelty of our work is the development of Gos and the development of the hybrid
implementation. The single flow solver is modular and can be augmented with other
single flow solutions (such as those referenced above).
Multi-Flow Solver Gos is a mixed integer programming model which creates
a multi-commodity flow quadratic optimization problem based on the prescribed de-
mands in the network. After this, Gos searches for network configurations which not
17
only solve the flow problem, but also minimize the sum of squares of the link and
router utilizations, as well as the sum of the maximum link and router utilizations in
the network. This objective effectively provides load balancing within the network.
Prior works describe optimization models which optimize only single flows for quality
of service or optimize multiple flows and minimize link utilization [3, 74], but to our
knowledge there has not been a model such as Gos, which simultaneously optimizes
for multiple flows on a full SDN network while minimizing both the maximum link
and router utilizations while using destination routing. Prior work assumes that net-
work devices take use both source and destination to make routing decisions. Our
model allows only the destination to be used for routing packets.
Once such a solution is obtained, our SDN Application translates the model output
into a configuration for an SDN controller (our experiments use Frenetic [43]), then
uses the controller to push flow table rules to the SDN devices in the network.
Evaluation We evaluate the performance of our solutions: 1) in a static demand
manner to ensure the routing solution delivers the expected throughput, and 2) in
a dynamic demand manner paired with a single flow solver SP routing module to
show that the QoS can be improved by re-optimizing. Specifically regarding QoS,
we consider throughput as a function of the number of bytes delivered per unit of
time. We explore the associated costs and benefits of this implementation in Mininet,
a software-defined networking emulation framework using Frenetic [43] as the SDN
controller.
We evaluated the solution quality of the GOSH framework with networks with
up to 370 nodes and over 1500 flows of TCP traffic. For networks of 37 nodes and
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(a) Single flow (b) Multi flow
Figure 3.2: A The preponderance of existing QoS routing systems: a single flow solution
handles each request individually. Figure 3.2b methodology for Gos multiple flows are
provided in order to periodically re-establish the globally optimal multi-flow solution
34 flows we solve in half a second and for networks with over a hundred nodes and
over 300 flows we solve just over 20 seconds on average. We saw on average 10-40%
improvements in throughput between SP and Gos solutions with higher returns as
demand approaches network capacity.
Organization The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 4.2 in-
troduces further related work, Section 3.3 describes our Gos model and the overall
GOSH framework, Section 3.4 describes our evaluation setup with results in Sec-
tion ??, and finally Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background and Related Work
The primary focus of our work is SDN traffic engineering as it relates to network QoS.
As described in the Introduction, the majority of research in this area involves single
demand flow solutions for a source - destination pair solved as a CSP. Shortest path
problems are often found as a component of the constrained shortest path problems
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which are common place in QoS routing for SDN [18]. Here we provide an overview
of metrics, single flow solutions, and finally multi-flow solutions.
Metrics There are a range of QoS metrics used in determining the cost of each
edge in a shortest path. These metrics can be based on physical limitations, distance
and propagation delay [118]. QoS metrics can also describe the current network
state, such as the congestion on the network as determined by polling the network
switches [37]. Lin et al. [77] measure current flow satisfaction ratios, while packet
loss on links is measured in [124]. Zhang et al. [131] insert echo messages and use
the latency of these messages to determine edge quality. Similarly, van Adrichem et
al. [120] design specific probe packets between measurement points in the network
and use timing. These approaches use polling and active measurement techniques.
Our solution focuses on the physical limitations of the network and can be augmented
with measurement.
Single Flow Solutions Layeghy et al. [74] built a constraint programming model
that determined the optimum way to route a new flow, producing solutions in under
400 ms. However, this work did not evaluate the performance of their solutions in a
SDN, only the model solve time was considered. Kucminski et al. [71] modified a least
cost path algorithm to identify the path that currently has the least load as determined
using SDN switch port counters. Egilmez et al. [37] split traffic into two categories:
delay sensitive or delay insensitive. Delay insensitive traffic is always routed using
shortest path routing. However, when congestion is detected delay sensitive traffic
has its path recomputed using a LARAC (Lagrange Relaxation based Aggregated
Cost) which solves a Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm with traffic delay constraints.
Note their solution is a relaxation and thus heuristic. Note that their technique is
not designed to preemptively avoid congestion. Additionally, by only re-routing delay
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sensitive traffic it is unclear what impact not considering non-delay sensitive traffic
has on over all quality of service.
Multi-Flow Solutions Capelle et al. [26] explore both single flow point-to-point
and multicast solutions for network virtualization. Their model includes constraints
for link bandwidth and switching capacity as network resources. However they do
not consider multiple point-to-point flows in a solution but rather single multicast
solutions. In this work the authors allow a 5% gap from optimal as satisfactory. For
networks of similar size networks, we are able to find optimal solutions for the multi-
flow problem (34 flows) in less than a second while they report solution times of a few
seconds for each individual point-to-multipoint flow. Tomonic and Radusinovic [119]
use a heuristic approach based on propagation delay and returning the k shortest
paths between ingress and egress routers. The authors consider a backbone SDN
environment and make the assumption that propagation delay caused by geographic
separation will dominate traffic delay. Their work considers traffic as either delay
sensitive in which case they attempt to provide QoS or non-delay sensitive in which
case routed only if there is sufficient guaranteed bandwidth. Unfortunately, their QoS
method of using propagation delay would most likely not translate beyond backbone
networks, considering the generally shorter distances between nodes. Additionally,
using a shortest path algorithm while not considering current network congestion is
likely to result in bottlenecks [123]. Yu et al. [125] use deep reinforcement learning
to configure backbone SDN networks. They use the ML model to optimize routing
for network performance metrics, such as delay and throughput. To evaluate this
framework, the authors built a simulation network environment of 25 nodes using
OMNeT++ and compared configurations against routing generated either randomly
or using OSPF. Their evaluations focus mainly on delay as the network performance
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metric, with some experiments focusing on throughput over different traffic loads.
While this approach shows much promise for backbone networks it is unclear how it
would perform on networks of larger scale.
3.3 The GOSH framework
This section details the GOSH framework which is described in Figure 3.2. As a
reminder, the primary question of this work is:
Can single-flow problem QoS solutions be augmented with a periodic
multi-flow solution?
We view the global solution as “ground truth,” something that is accurate for a
moment in time before new demands emerge and the network state changes. From
this global solution individual demands can be solved with an existing single-flow
solution until some time where it is favorable to reacquire the ground truth. Our
proposed solution is a way of periodically pushing back to an optimum and ensuring
that individual decisions have not been harmful. It is meant to be complimentary to
existing solutions that will continue to be deployed to handle emerging demands and
paired with our multi-flow solution to re-optimize the global network configuration.
We first detail the multi-flow constraint model and then our implementation in an
SDN application.
3.3.1 Multi-Flow Solver
This section describes the optimization model used to obtain network configurations
that uphold quality of service. GOSH uses a mixed integer programming to model
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multi-commodity network flow and correlates improved quality of service with lower
global maximum link and router utilizations. In mixed integer programming, the four
primary components are Inputs, Variables, Constraints, and an Objective function.
These are listed below.
Inputs
R – the set of SDN devices (routers).
H – the set of hosts (machines) on the network.
G ⊂ R – the set of external gateway devices in the network.
D = R∪H – the set of all network devices.
L ⊂ D ×D – the set of all network links.
F – the set of tuples (h, k) ∈ D ×D defining desired traffic flows from source device
h to sink device k.
s∗ – an artificial node in the network used as the global source of all flows.
t∗ – an artificial node in the network used as the global destination of all flows.
Q(l) : L → R – the capacity of link l.
K(i) : R → R – the throughput of network device i.
δ−(i) : D → 2D – the set of vertices with outbound arcs leading to vertex i.
δ+(i) : D → 2D – the set of vertices with inbound arcs originating at vertex i.
src(f) ∈ D – the network device source of flow f .
dst(f) ∈ D – the network device destination of flow f .
q(f) : F → R – the quantity of data attributed to flow f .
Variables
ρfi,j ∈ {0, 1} – for every f ∈ F and every (i, j) ∈ L, indicates whether link (i, j)
carries flow f .
dki,j ∈ {0, 1} – for a flow destination k, indicates whether device i sends traffic bound
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for k to device j.
µi,j ∈ R+ – for every (i, j) ∈ L, the utilization of link (i, j)
υr ∈ R+ – for every r ∈ R, the utilization of router r
Ml ∈ R+ – the maximum link utilization in the network.
Mr ∈ R+ – the maximum router utilization in the network.
Constraints
The first part of the model captures the networking side of the model, including how
to route flows, respect capacities of devices and how to block specific flows.
ρfs∗,src(f) = 1 , ∀f ∈ F (3.1)






ρfi,k , ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ D (3.2)
Equation 4.6 depicts the flow balance equations that dictate that, at every network
device, every inbound flow must also be outbound.
ρfi,j = 0, ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ H \ {src(f), dst(f)},∀j ∈ δ+(i) (3.3)
ρfdst(f),j = 0, ∀f ∈ F ,∀j ∈ δ
+(i) \ {t∗} (3.4)
Equation 3.3 prevents any host from routing traffic for any flows in which it is not
involved. Equation 3.4 states that flow destinations can only forward traffic to the
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flow sink by preventing the use of any other outbound arc.
∑
δ+(i)





i,j , ∀f ∈ F ,∀(i, j) ∈ L (3.6)
Equations 3.5 and 3.6 enforce destination routing.
∑
f∈F










(ρfi,j · q(f)) ≤Mr ·K(i), ∀i ∈ R (3.8)
Equation 3.7 simply models the bounds on link capacities, allowing for the capacities
to be scaled by the maximum link utilization in the network. Equation 3.8 plays a




















 , ∀i ∈ R (3.10)
Equations 3.9 and 3.10 calculate, respectively, link and router utilizations.
Objective
The objective function in this model is the sum of squares of the link and router
utilizations, along with the maximum link and router utilizations in the network.
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Figure 3.3: SDN Application. The flow solver passes high level solutions to the Policy
Maker which compiles and sends flow table updates to SDN controller.








+ α1Ml + α2Mr (3.11)
3.3.2 SDN Application
The high level flow rules generated by the optimization solver consist of a device
path from source to destination for each demand simply stating the device names.
This high level solution is given to our SDN application and transformed first to SDN
policies and then compiled into individual Openflow switch flow tables. We implement
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our SDN Application using Frenetic, a high level SDN programming language [43].
Frenetic provides a declarative query language for traffic classification and filtering
as well as a reactive network policy management library [43]. Frenetic maintains
both high level policies as well as low level Openflow forwarding rules. Frenetic
is a compositional SDN controller allowing us to combine multiple routing policies
with logical expressions using either parallel or sequential composition. The Frenetic
Run Time compiling process ensures correct application of our combined policies.
This is in contrast to non-compositional SDN applications that parse routing policies
in a pipelined manner resulting in complications if flow definitions aren’t cleverly
arranged [37].
In the SDN application we implement layer 3 routing by using the Frenetic pro-
vided source and destination ip address filters to build the port forwarding policies.
We use default deny so only the packets that match the installed routing policies will
be forwarded in the network, others will be dropped. For evaluation we combined our
Gos QoS module with SPa shortest path routing module [108] to handle emerging
demand between Gos solutions.
3.4 Long Term Flow Evaluation
The initial evaluation section considers all demand as long term, meaning once a
demand is introduced it remains constant for the duration of the test. In a later
section we add a more dynamic demand model where combine both short term and
long term demand on the network.
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3.4.1 Benchmark Generation
To evaluate our framework we created a benchmark generator that creates a JSON
file containing a detailed network description as well as network demand. The full
description of the benchmark are in chapter 1.
3.4.2 Mininet Configuration
We generate the network described in the instance in Mininet [73], recreating the
hosts, switches, links. Mininet is an open-source network emulation tool that uses a
process based virtualization running all devices network stacks on a single OS kernel.
The impact of implementing the actual network stack enables code to be developed
and tested in Mininet and ported to other network environments for implementation.
Network devices are implemented as Mininet switches with identifier, port speeds
and memory taken from the output of the benchmark generation. Switch capacity,
indicates the rate at which a switch can process flows. (It is additionally used in
Gos to specify the maximum number of routing rules that can be stored by a switch.
In this way, the solution presented by Gos should also be implementable on the
switches.) The network infrastructure is generated using the bandwidth capacity
provided in the instance. Mininet automatically maps these connections to ports on
the switches.
Hosts each have a single network interface and connect to a single edge switch as
in the Fat-Tree topology. We use the host identifier provided in the instance and have
Mininet auto assign each host a layer 2 MAC and layer 3 IPv4 address. Once the
network is generated we build a data structure to maintain a detailed description of
the network containing switch port and network addressing assignments from Mininet.
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3.4.3 Traffic Generation Model
The routing solution is evaluated in the analysis module by first generating traffic
specified in the benchmark. The benchmark generator has an input parameters to
indicate the volume of initial demand to generate. The iPerf tool is used to generate
traffic for our benchmark in our emulated network for evaluation [1]. iPerf provides the
the option to generate traffic for both the TCP and UDP transport layer protocols.
We use iPerf in a fixed bandwidth mode for specified time period. We generate
simultaneous iPerf commands for each demand in the benchmark. The tool also
generates a report that details the results of each test. The result provides several
useful measurements for assessment, reported for each second of the test as well as a
summary result for the entire test. We use the per second bandwidth measurement
in our evaluations to access the quality of each routing configuration. The results of
each iPerf test is aggregated across the duration of the test to determine the total
traffic on the network at one time.
3.4.4 Experimental Design
As described in the introduction GOSH is a hybrid of two QoS modules, the first
simple module routes using shortest path, we call this QoS module SP. The second
is Gos which takes all current flows and solves for a global optimum for how to
route those flows while minimizing the network resource utilization (switch and link
capacity). We perform two major tests:
1. A static demand test where all flows are routed using a single QoS module.
This allows to compare the relative performance of SP vs. Gos.
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2. A increasing demand test with three phases, first GOSH routes all flows using
Gos in the intermediate as additional demand is placed on the network deploys
SP for routing additional demand and finally invokes Gos to solve the new
optimum routing, and replaces routing with this new optimum. This test shows
the value of the hybrid solution: using traditional QoS mechanisms as flows
arrive and the Gos solution can be applied periodically subject to providing
enough performance improvement.
Static Demand Bandwidth Test Each test is replicated 10 times and results
are provided using an error bar plot with indicators at the min, 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90
percentiles for a 100 second duration. Each individual cycle of a test includes a clean
build of all elements including the routing solution, emulation network, the network
controller application, flow table install, and the traffic generation.
This test compares the Multi-flow Global solution against an implementation of
SP routing using the previously described Fat-tree-4 network with 16 hosts using
TCP and varied amounts of traffic. Recall that to increase the amount of demand
generated by the demand module we vary the number of flows per host. We generate
benchmarks with 32, 64 and 96 flows in this experiment. In each iteration the demand
is given to the routing solver (SP , Gos), the routing solution is generated and
installed prior the the iPerf commands starting.
Increasing Demand Bandwidth Test The goal of this test is to better un-
derstand the trade-offs of integrating the global solver with increasing demand. In
order to facilitate this we use our benchmark generator to generate both initial de-
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mand as previously described and additional demand. To generate additional demand
our benchmark generator provides an input parameter to determine the volume of
additional demand to generate.
In the test we generate a Fat-tree 4 benchmark, with 16 hosts and 64 flows. We
repeat the experiment 10 times and provide the resulting throughput in Figure3.6 .
We generate a routing solution for the initial demand using the Gos QoS module
in our SDN application. The routing solution is installed in our OpenFlow switches
and iPerf commands are generated for the initial demand. We introduce 32 flows of
additional demand at the 60 second mark and use the SP module to generate a routing
solution. This solution is sent to the Frenetic controller to be recompiled and pushed
to the SDN devices. In the final stage of this evaluation we combine the initial and
the additional demand and re-optimize using Gos. This high level solution is then
send to Frenetic to compile and push updated flow tables to the switches. Looking
ahead to our evaluation, we expect to see three periods: 1) initial configuration using
Gos 2) handling additional flows using SP and 3) reconfiguration using Gos.
3.5 Long Term Flow Results
We focus our discussion of results on the two demand tests described in Section 3.4.4.
As a reminder, we consider two tests: 1) a static test where we compare routing new
flows with SP vs optimizing routing new flows using Gos and 2) a additional demand
test where an initial set of flows is routed with Gos, new arriving flows are routed
with SP, and then routing is reconfigured once a solution for all the new flows arrives
from Gos. Additionally, we review the solve time of Gos over various instances.
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(a) Benchmark A Demand Met (b) Benchmark B Demand Met
(c) Benchmark A TCP retries (d) Benchmark B TCP retries
Figure 3.4: Shortest Path module in blue and the multi-flow optimization solution
routing in purple. Start of bar represents min, widening at 10% and 25% with a line at
50%, reducing width at 75% and 90%, stopping at the max for each. Benchmark A: 98
flows (68 internal and 30 external) totaling 9019 Mbps demand. Benchmark B: 66 flows
(46 internal and 20 external) totaling 5719 Mbps demand.
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(a) Congestion with Shortest Path Solution (b) Congestion with Multi-flow optimized
solution
Figure 3.5: Link utilization diagrams of a static bandwidth test from Figure 3.4a. Edges
in red are over capacity.
3.5.1 Static Demand Test
Figure 3.4 displays the results of our static test on two different configurations labled
Benchmark A and Benchmark B over 10 runs. Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4c reference
Benchmark A show the demand met and number of TCP retries, and Figure 3.4b
and Figure 3.4d show the demand met and number of retries for Benchmark B. As
a reminder the data was sent using the iPerf3 tool, generating TCP traffic at a fixed
data rate. Each flow demand implemented as an individual iPerf3 command and the
aggregate of the results are presented in the figure. Both benchmarks percentage of
demand met displayed the most variability at the head and tail of which is partly ex-
plained when we consider the TCP protocol’s congestion avoidance strategy through
additive increases in traffic sending rate with multiplicative back-off. Analysis of the
iPerf results substantiated our suspicion as we noted the adjustment of the conges-
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tion window, starting lower and generally increasing. The increase in the congestion
window is only part of the story, we need to also look at the associated number of
TCP retires in Figure 3.4c-d.
In looking at Benchmark A, we notice that Gos performs very well in meeting the
demand and that there is very little variability in the results. SP on the other hand
has a longer initial period of adjustment where the TCP protocol is adjusting until
we see a significant increase in the packets being dropped at about 20 seconds for SP
in blue in. We can see the associated -leveling off- of the percentage of demand met
at this point, although the the variability continues with the transport layer trying
to handle the demand. In looking at the results on Benchmark B we see that Gos
still outperforms SP although neither was able to meet all the demand due to the
fact that we exceeded the maximum bisection bandwidth of this configuration by
over 15%. Again the significant variability in the demand met is closely paired with
the number of retires that TCP is sending. These results indicate the importance
of balancing demand and resources with multi-flow route optimization to avoid the
exponential back-off of the transport layer protocols. These results Figure 3.4 show
us the performance in the percentage of demand met and and indicators of good and
poor performance in the number of TCP retries but to understand why the retries
are necessary we need to understand the network congestion.
For our discussion we will consider a link to be congested if the amount of data
being sent on it is over it is capacity. Figure 3.5 shows the congestion of the two
solutions SP and Gos for Benchmark A. Each solution was required to route all
demand and that neither solution avoided oversubscribing the network. In order
to evaluate the solution we look to where this congestion takes place and if it was
avoidable. In looking at where the congestion takes place the SP has links congested
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at all levels of the network, host-switch and switch-switch while the Gos solution
only has congestion at the host-switch edges. Considering the last hop host-switch
edges, this congestion is unavoidable given the requirement to route all demand. The
switch-switch congestion in this case an indicator of the quality of the solution. With
that in mind it is interesting to see where each QoS module suffers from congestion,
the SPModule utilizes a set path regardless of the utilization and as a result several
links are congested. Conversely the multi-flow optimization solution has balanced
traffic and only shows over utilization of unavoidable links.
3.5.2 Increasing Demand Test
The results of this test show the promise of the Hybrid approach of combining a
very fast single-flow solution with a globally optimal multi-flow solution. The results
are shown in Figure 3.6 show three distinct phases of throughput resulting from the
implementation of the 3 separate routing configurations of the same network topology.
In the initial phase there is a total of 5184 Mbps demand which is solved with Gos,
we can see that the we are meeting all demand (with small variations). In examining
the individual link statistics for this segment there are 2 links above capacity both
are from switch-host and therefore unavoidable.
In the second phase which begins at the 30 sec mark, we introduced an additional
2412 Mbps of traffic for a total of 7596 Mbps demand. This additional demand is first
routed using the SP routing solution and as shown in the results effectively routes
and additional 1066 Mbps or 44% of the additional demand. While the SP solution
is routing the additional demand, Gos is working on an optimal solution for the
combined demand. In is test the average time for Gos to solve the model with an
35
Figure 3.6: Results of the additional bandwidth test. Initial demand is routed with
multi-flow optimization solution. At 30 seconds additional demand is introduced and
routed with the SPmodule. At 60 seconds the combined demand re-optimized and routing
is updated with multi-flow solution.
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globally optimal solution was under 30 seconds.
In the final phase of this test we pass all the demand to Gos and the routing
solution is implemented at 60 second mark. We see an improvement in the throughput
at this stage, with the Gos solution able to route 14% more of the additional demand
than the SP solution.
3.5.3 Gos Solve Time
Table 3.1 shows the average solve time for GOS over a several instances where both
pod size and the number of flows per host were varied. The average solve time
is extremely fast through the entirety of the pod 4 instances, but can experience
extreme slowdowns starting with the pod 6 networks (several of the pod 6 instances
exceeded the time limit of 900 seconds). Surprisingly, almost all of the pod 8 instances
did not time out, with most solving in under a handful of minutes. Lastly, just about
every pod 10 instance exceeded the 900 second time limit.
There are a couple takeaways from these initial results. First, both the number of
network devices and the number of flows greatly impact the model solve time, with
flows seemingly having a more significant impact. This is to be expected, however,
as the model size (number of variables and constraints) increases proportionally with
the number of network devices and the number of flows to be routed. Second, the
structure of the flows to be routed seems to also have a very significant impact on the
solve time. This is seen most prominently when comparing the high number of time-
outs over pod 6 instances with the very few timeouts over pod 8 instances. Perhaps
some of the prescribed demands result in many solutions with similar objective lower
bounds, resulting in more of the configuration search space having to be explored.
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Network Topology Network Traffic and Solve Time
Pod Hosts Switches Links Flows Avg Solve Time (s)* % Timed Out Flows Avg Solve Time (s) % Timed Out
4 16 21 52 34 0.67 0 98 5.86 0
6 54 46 171 110 46.1 11 326 24.6 56
8 128 81 400 258 269 11 770 405 11
10 250 126 775 502 755 78 1502 N/A 100
Table 3.1: Average solve time for Gos over instances with varying numbers of hosts and
flows per host (9 instances per variation). *Solve time is average for instances that did not
time out.
Further analysis must be conducted to narrow in on a more concrete explanation for
this phenomenon.
3.6 Dynamic Flow Evaluation
Using the previously discussed evaluation process as a baseline I would like to explore
modifications to the network demand and traffic generation. In this section we add
the notion of short and long term demand or traffic.
3.6.1 Benchmark Generation
The instance generator was modified to categorize each network demand as either
short or long. The short designation is intended to represent bursty traffic such as
a web page request. The long designation identifies traffic that requires a minimum





In this set of tests we have 90% of all flows small at 10 Mbps long duration flow or
10 MB short duration flow. We generate 10% large flows 500 Mbps for long duration
traffic or 500 MB for short duration traffic. In this model we leverage the short and
long designation of each demand. We introduce an additional short demand traffic
module in which a Poission distribution is used to determine the inter arrival time
of each flow, centered at a half-second. The long duration traffic is initiated at the
start of each test and continued for the duration of the test. In this traffic model we
focus on the performance the long duration traffic with a given routing configuration.
The short flows that are processed with the Poission distribution are considered back-
ground traffic and therefore not included in the aggregated iPerf output. However,
even though the short flows are not included in our analysis they are being generated
and routed on the network during the test, contending for network resources with the
QoS traffic.
3.6.4 Additional Routing Modules
We develop two additional routing modules to be used in the evaluation process.
1. DWSP Dijkstra’s Weighted Shortest Path is designed as a global solver using
the bandwidth requirement for each demand to weight the edges. A random
selection process is used to order the processing of individual demands through
the algorithm. The graph edge weights are updated after each pass of the al-
gorithm. We use DWSP to compare against Gos as a comparison of global
solvers, specifically looking at network congestion that results from each solu-
tion.
39
2. LBSP Load Balanced Shortest Path is implemented as an intermediate be-
tween SP and DWSP. The algorithm is implemented exactly as DWSP with
the exception in the weighting of the edges. Here as demands are assigned to
edges the weight of each edge is incremented, rather than using the bandwidth
requirement. This has the affect of load balancing, taking advantage of the
multitude of equal length paths available in the Fat-Tree topology. This mod-
ule is implemented as a single flow solver paired with Gos (not against) in our
evaluation.
3.6.5 Dynamic Flow Experimental Design
Dynamic Traffic Test The Integration of LBSP as the single flow solver with Gos
as a multi-flow solver for long duration traffic. In stage one we route all traffic with
LBSP. In stage two we pass all long duration traffic traffic to Gos and the short
duration traffic to LBSP. The long duration traffic is solved first with the resulting
edge utilization passed to the single flow solver LBSP as a primer.
In the test we generate several instances of two classes of benchmarks using our
instance generator. Benchmark class C are all Fat-Tree-4 with 66 demands about
half short and half long duration flows. When the traffic is generated for this class of
benchmark there are 35 long duration flows that run for the duration of the test and
over 1200 short duration flows, about 10 per second arrive. In the benchmark D class
we have several instances of Fat-tree 4 with 96 demand pairs, again split half short
and half long with the same inter-arrival time distribution between flows.
We repeat each experiment 5 times and provide the resulting percentage of demand
met for the long duration flows in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.7 . First we generate a
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(a) random seed 6 (b) random seed 7 (c) random seed 8
Figure 3.7: Benchmark class C Percent Demand Met: LBSP routing 0-50 seconds then
a combination Gos and LBSP routing 50-100 seconds. There are 35 long duration flows
and over 1200 short flows. Start of bar represents min, widening at 10% and 25% with a
line at 50%, reducing width at 75% and 90%, stopping at the max for each.
routing solution for all the demand (long and short) using the LBSP routing module
in our SDN application. The routing solution is installed in our OpenFlow switches
and iPerf commands are generated as previously described. While these flows are
being routed we run Gos on the long duration demand and then re-calculate the
routes for the short duration demand with LBSP. We push the update solution
to the SDN devices at the halfway mark of each test and continue the iPerf traffic
generation process for the second half.
3.7 Dynamic Flow Results
3.7.1 Dynamic Flow Test
The results show that using a hybrid approach to handle different traffic demand
patterns shows promise. The multi-flow solution determines the optimal routes for
our long duration traffic while we pass the short durration, bursty traffic off to a
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(a) random seed 3 (b) random seed 4 (c) random seed 5
Figure 3.8: Benchmark class D Percent Demand Met: LBSP routing 0-50 seconds then
a combination Gos and LBSP routing 50-100 seconds. There are 50 long duration flows
and over 1200 short flows. Start of bar represents min, widening at 10% and 25% with a
line at 50%, reducing width at 75% and 90%, stopping at the max for each.
single-flow solver. The results are shown in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.9. As a note, in
places where the graph indicates that over 100% of demand is being met results from
TCP retransmissions from previous time periods.
The results show two distinct phases 0-50 seconds using only a LBSP routing
solutions and 50-100 seconds using a combination of Gos and LBSP solutions. The
graphs clearly reflect where the updated routing configurations are pushed at the
mid point normally resulting in a higher percentage of demand met or less variance.
This step or lowering of variance is consistent across most of our results of various
benchmarks. Although not shown here there have been a low percentage of instances
in testing that showed a slight decrease in the hybrid routing which we attribute to
the placement and volume of the bursty traffic. Recall, that in our testing we route
all demand even if the volume of traffic will oversubscribe a portion of the network.
Additionally, we notice that in several of the results there is a tendency in the later
stages of the test to see a downward tail as a result of the TCP congestion avoidance
technique. As the routing of traffic progresses with each phase the volume of bursty
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traffic introduces congestion the the long term traffic is eventually impacted.
(a) random seed 3 (b) random seed 4 (c) random seed 5
Figure 3.9: Benchmark class D Percent Demand Met: LBSP routing 0-50 seconds then
a combination Gos and LBSP routing 50-100 seconds. There are 50 long duration flows
and over 1200 short flows. Start of bar represents min, widening at 10% and 25% with a
line at 50%, reducing width at 75% and 90%, stopping at the max for each.
3.8 Conclusion
The hybrid implementation of a single flow solver to handle dynamic demand with a
multi-flow solver to re-establish network resource optimization shows promise. The
performance of the global solution is better than the shortest path routing solution in
terms of throughput. The apparent trade-off is the time it takes to solve the Global
model compared to the stability of the demand. The solution time is a factor of the
size of the network and the number of flows needed to be steered through the network.
The global solution’s performance improvements are only achieved when the traffic
remains stable long enough to solve and implement the improved routing.
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Chapter 4
Functionality and Security -
Layered Framework
4.1 Introduction
Network configuration is a crucial task in any enterprise. Administrators balance
functionality, performance, security, cost, and other industry specific requirements.
The resulting configuration is subject to periodic analysis and redesign due to red
team recommendations, emerging threats, and changing priorities.
Our Contribution This work introduces a new optimization framework that
finds network configurations that satisfy multiple (conflicting) requirements. We fo-
cus on data center networks (DCN) that use software defined networking (SDN).
Background on these settings is in Chapter 1. Our framework is called DocSDN
(Dynamic and Optimal Configuration of Software-Defined Networks).
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DocSDN searches for network configurations that simultaneously satisfy multiple
properties. DocSDN is organized into layers that consider different properties. The
core of DocSDN is a multistage optimization that decouples search on “orthogonal”
concerns. The majority of the technical work is to effectively separate concerns so the
optimization problems remain tractable. Our framework is designed to continually
produce network configurations based on changing requirements and threats. It frees
IT personnel from the complex question of how to satisfy multiple requirements and
can quickly incorporate new threat information.
DocSDN focuses on achieving functional requirements (such as network reach-
ability and flow satisfaction) and limiting security risk (such as isolating high risk
nodes and nodes under denial of service attack). Naturally, other layers such as per-
formance or cost can be incorporated. The search for a good configuration could be
organized in many ways. State-of-the-art approaches assess different properties in
isolation, frustrating search for a solution that satisfies all requirements. Ideally, a
framework should search for a configuration that simultaneously satisfies all require-
ments. This extreme is unlikely to be tractable on all but the smallest networks.
DocSDN mediates between these approaches separating the functional and security
search problems but introducing a feedback loop between the two search problems
based on cuts.
In the proposed organization the functional layer is “above” the security layer.
Through the feedback loop, the security layer describes a problematic part of the
network to the functional layer. The functional layer then refines its model and
searches for a functional configuration that satisfies an additional constraint. This
has the effect of blocking the problematic part of the configuration. Currently, the
feedback signal is a pair of nodes that should not be proximate in the network. After
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multiple iterations the two layers jointly produce a solution that optimizes the SDN
configuration both with respect to functionality and security risks.
DocSDN provides solutions of improving quality before the final solution. Thus,
the network can be reconfigured once the objective improves on the current configu-
ration by a large enough amount (to justify the cost/impact of reconfiguration).
The underlying optimization problems are NP-hard but optimization technology
has seen tremendous advances in performance during the past few decades. Since
1991, mathematical programming solvers have delivered speedups of 11 orders of mag-
nitude [20, 45]. Hybrid techniques such as Benders decomposition [16, 30, 52, 53] and
column generation [12,49,72] (aka, Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition [34]) made it possi-
ble to solve huge problems thanks to on-demand generation of macroscopic variables
and the dynamic addition of critical constraints. Large Neighborhood Search [111]
further contributed to delivering high-quality solution within constrained time bud-
gets.
These techniques are beginning to see adoption in network security. Yu et al.
recently applied stochastic optimization with Bender’s decomposition to assess net-
work risk under uncertainty for IoT devices [126]. They used Bender’s decomposition
on a scenario-based stochastic optimization model to produce a parent problem that
chooses a deployment plan while children are concerned with choosing the optimal
nodes to serve the demands in individual scenarios. In comparison, our approach ad-
dresses both functional and security requirements. It relies on Bender’s cuts from the
security layer (child) to rule out vulnerable functional plans whose routing paths fail
to adequately minimize risks and maximize served clients. We now briefly describe
the framework (a formal description is in Section 4.3) and present an illustrative
example.
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Figure 4.1: DocSDN Framework. A layered decomposition that breaks down
configuration synthesis into functional and security layers.
Overview of DocSDN Figure 4.1 presents an overview of the framework. The
functional layer takes as input a Functional Model that describes the network includ-
ing the physical topology, capacity, the allowable communication patterns and the
demand requirements. Network reachability begins with a priming procedure that
generates the k-least cost paths to the optimizer for each source/destination pair in
the demand requirements. The objective for the functional layer is to find a logical
topology (a collection of routed paths) that meets all demand requirements while
favoring shorter length routing paths and load balancing. The program is formulated
as quadratic binary program (QBP). The solution as determined by the functional
layer is passed to the security layer.
The output of the functional layer and a security model are the input for the secu-
rity layer. The current configuration is fed to a module that uses risk assessments for
the individual network devices (obtained for example using a vulnerability database)
to assess the overall risk of the entire configuration. In our current implementation
this risk calculation is based on a simple risk propagation model where a path’s risk is
based on the risk of nodes on the path and close to the source and sink. The security
layer can deploy firewalls and deep packet inspection as network defenses. Since these
mechanisms affect route capacity, the security layer has a dual objective function: 1)
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maximizing the functional objective and 2) minimizing security risk. The security
objective is formulated as a mixed integer program (MIP). When the security search
completes, it proposes nodes to the functional layer that should be separated. As an
example, a high value node with low risk may be placed in a different (virtual) LAN
than a high risk node. These Benders cuts are designed to entice a better logical
topology from a subsequent iteration in the functional layer. This feedback loop be-
tween the two layers can iterate multiple times. When no further cuts are available,
the overall output is a set of configuration rules.
An example configuration This section describes an application of our frame-
work to automatically respond to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Cur-
rent DDoS attacks demonstrate peak volume of 1 Tbps [68]. Many DDoS defense
techniques require changes to the network behavior by rate limiting, filtering, or re-
configuring the network (see [57,58,85,95,128]). Recent techniques [40] leverage SDNs
to react to DDoS attacks in a dynamic and flexible manner. We show how such a
response would work in our framework using a toy network illustrated in Figure 4.2.
A more realistic network and the framework’s response are described in Section 5.4.
We stress that DDoS attacks are often short in timescale making human diagnosis
and reaction costly or impractical. Consider a focused DDoS attack against a num-
ber of services in an enterprise but not the entirety of its publicly accessible address
space. (The Great Cannon’s attack against GreatFire targeted two specific Github
repositories [82].) We assume a service hosted by H1 is targeted, while services on
H2, H3 and H4 are not.
Recall, the functional layer establishes a logical topology (forwarding rules) while
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Figure 4.2: Toy network example with a single gateway device G1, two intermediate
switches S1 and S2 and four hosts. We assume the switches are physically connected to all
hosts.
the security layer adds network defenses (packet inspection modules and firewall
rules). We elide how the attack is detected and assume it increases the risk score
for H1 in the security model.
The first iteration The functional layer proposes a candidate configuration where
G1 routes all traffic intended for H1 and H2 to S1 which then forwards the traffic and
G1 routes traffic intended for H3 and H4 to S2 which then forwards the traffic. This
is the first candidate solution presented to the security layer.
Since H1 is high risk the security layer proposes a firewall at S1 to block all port
80 traffic. This reduces risk at the cost of blocking all traffic to H2. Of course, in
real firewalls more fine-grained rules are possible, this simplified example is meant to
illustrate a case where collateral damage to the functional objective is necessary to
achieve the security objective. Since traffic is being blocked to a node with low risk,
the security layer asks the functional layer to separate H1 and H2 so H2 does not
suffer.
Repeated iterations The functional layer now has a constraint that H1 and H2
should not be collocated in the network. As such, it proposes a new configuration
with H1 and H3 under S1 and H2 and H4 under S2. This is then sent to the security
layer. The security layer makes a similar assessment and proposes a firewall rule at
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S2, finds this recommendation hurts functionality and requests separation of H1 and
H3.
This process repeats with the functional layer proposing to collocate H1 and H4.
The security layer similarly asks to separate H1 and H4. Finally, H1 is segregated
from all other nodes. This produces a configuration where H1 is the only child of
S1. Note that having H2, H3 and H4 under a single switch may hurt performance
but the effect is less than blocking traffic to one of the nodes entirely. DocSDN can
then output the candidate solution as high level SDN fragments (using a high-level
language like Frenetic [44]).
Recovery Importantly, when the DDoS abates, DocSDN automatically reruns with
a changed risk for H1, outputting a binary tree.
Organization The rest of the work is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides
background on our application and discusses related work, Section 4.3 describes our
framework and accompanying optimization models, Section 5.4 evaluates the frame-
work and finally Section 5.5 concludes.
4.2 Background and Related Work
Our framework is intended to be modular and allow integration of prior work on
evaluating network configurations. As such there is a breadth of relevant work. Due
to space constraints we focus on the most relevant works. In the conclusion we
elaborate on the characteristics needed to integrate a prior assessment tool into our
framework (see Section 5.5).
Measuring Network Risk Known threats against computer systems are main-
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tained by governments and industry. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
is a publicly available dictionary including an identifier and description of known
vulnerabilities [32], CVE does not provide a severity score or priority ranking for
vulnerabilities. The US National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [92] is provided by
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The NVD augments
the CVE, adding severity scores and impact ratings for vulnerabilities in the CVE.
There are many mechanisms for measuring the security risk on a network [27,59,
80,115,116]. Lippmann et al. present a network security model which computes risk
based on a list of the most current threats [79]. This model implements a cycle of
observe network state, compute risk, prioritize risk, and mitigate the risk.
This loop is often codified into an attack graph [56,62,106]. Attack graphs try to
model the most likely paths that an attacker could use to penetrate a network. Attack
Graphs often leverage one or more of the aforementioned vulnerability assessment
tools as input, combined with a network topology and device software configurations
to generate the graph. Current attack graph technologies provide recommendations
to network administrators that effectively remove edges from the graph and trigger
a re-evaluation of the utility for the attacker. To the best of our knowledge, current
practice does not leverage network risk measurement into constraints used for the
generation of new configurations.
Network Reachability The expansion of SDN has aided the applicability of
formal verification to computer networks. Prior to SDN, the lack of clear separation
between the data and control plain created an intractable problem when considering a
network of any scale. Bounded model checking using SAT and SMT solvers [13, 129]
can currently verify reachability properties in networks with several thousands of
nodes.
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Configuration Search Constraint Programming (CP) was introduced in the
late 1980s [104] and is used for scheduling [11], routing, and configuration prob-
lems. Large-scale optimization problems are often decomposed including Benders [30]
and Dantzig-Wolfe [34]. Soft constraints or Lagrangian relaxation are used for over-
constrained problems or when the problem is too computationally expensive. Stochas-
tic optimization techniques have been used for many applications in resilience [22,88]
and the underlying methodologies are a key part of this research. Prior work in con-
figuration management with constraint programming [29,75] focused on connectivity
or security. We are not aware of any work that balances these two objectives in a
meaningful way.
4.3 Implementation
Figure 4.1 outlines the overall structure of the DocSDN framework. layer inter-
connections as well as their internals. The functional layer uses a mathematical
optimization model that is fed to a quadratic mixed boolean programming (QBP)
solver alongside an initial set of least-cost paths to be considered to service the re-
quired flows. The security layer receives the topology chosen by the functional layer
and a security model to solve, with a mixed-integer programming (MIP) solver, the
risk minimization problem. The output can result in low-risk flows being blocked
as a consequence of deploying firewalls to mitigate high-risk flows. A result analysis
module then produces equivalence classes that are sent back to the functional layer
to request the separation of specific flows that should not share paths, with the goal
of minimizing the collateral damage to low-risk flows. These equivalence classes gen-
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erate additional constraints, known as Bender’s cuts, that are added to the functional
solver for a new iteration. The remainder of this section describes the major modules
in Figure 4.1.
4.3.1 Functional Layer
The mathematical optimization model in the functional layer is a quadratic mixed
binary programming model. In constraint programming the four main components
are Inputs, Variables, Constraints, and an Objective function. Inputs are below.
Inputs
N – the set of all network devices
E – the set of edges (pair of vertices) connecting network devices
T – the set of types of traffic to be routed
F – the set of (s, t, T ) ∈ N × N × T tuples defining desired traffic flows of type T
from source node s to sink node t.
D(f) : F → R – the actual demand for each flow f ∈ F
C ⊆ 2N – a subset of sets of network devices
R ⊆ C × C – pairs (c1, c2) of equivalence classes that segregate traffic from c1 to c2.
P – the set of all paths
P (e) : E → P – the set of all paths containing edge e
P (n) : N → P – the set of all paths containing node n
P (c) : C → P – the set of all paths containing a node in c
N(p) : P → C – the set of nodes appearing in path p
P (s, t) : N ×N → P – the set of all paths s→ t
cap(e) : E → R – gives the capacity of an edge e.
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Variables
activep,T ∈ {0, 1}, – for every path p ∈ P and traffic type T ∈ T , indicates whether
path p carries traffic of type T
flowp,T ∈ R≥0 – for every path p ∈ P and traffic type T ∈ T , amount of flow of type
T that is sent along path p
equivc,n ∈ {0, 1} – does node n ∈ N appear in an active path together with a node
in equivalence class c
sharec1,c2,n ∈ {0, 1} – indicates whether node n ∈ N appears on any active path with
nodes in classes c1, c2 ∈ C. Namely,








activep,∗ = 1 if there is a type T ∈ T where activep,T = 1
loadn ∈ R – the amount of flow that goes through node n




flowp,T ≤ cap(e), ∀e ∈ E (4.1)
∑
p∈P (s,t)
flowp,T ≥ D(s, t, T ), ∀(s, t, T ) ∈ F (4.2)








(activep,T ),∀T ∈ T , n ∈ N , c ∈ C (4.5)




flowp,T ,∀n ∈ N (4.7)
Equation 4.1 enforces the edge capacity constraint to service the demand of all
paths flowing through it. Equation 4.2 ensures that enough capacity is available to
meet the demand of an (s, t, T ) flow. Equation 4.3 ensures that some non-zero ca-
pacity is used if a specific path is activated (conversely, an inactive path can only
have a 0 flow). Equation 4.4 states that a single path should be chosen to service a
given flow f ∈ F . Equations 4.5 define the auxiliary variables equivc,n as true if and
only if node n ∈ N appears on an active path sharing a node with the equivalence
class c ∈ C. Equation 4.6 defines an active path that shares at least one node with
two classes. Finally, equation 4.7 defines the load of a node as the sum of the flows






p,T len(p) ∗ flowp,T +
α1
∑






The objective function 4.8 in this model is a weighted sum of three terms. The first
term captures the total flows which are penalized by the length of the path used to
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dispatch those flows (such policies are codified in OSFP [87] and BGP practice [48]).
The second term gives a unit credit each time equivalence classes on the segregation
list R do not share a node. (Due to this term, the objective value of the final
solution may change between iterations of the functional layer.) The third and final
term contribute to a bias towards solutions that achieve load balancing thanks to the
quadratic component which heavily penalizes nodes with large loads.
Solving the Functional Model The functional model starts with empty sets C and
R which are augmented with each iteration of the framework. New sets of nodes
are added to C and new segregation rules are added to R (by the security layer).
In the current implementation, least cost paths between pairs of nodes s, t are not
generated “on demand”. Instead, the generation is limited to the first best k such
paths, for increasing values of k. This process will ultimately be improved to use
column generation techniques [34].
4.3.2 Risk Calculation
After the functional layer finds an optimal solution, it passes this solution to the risk
calculation procedure. This input is the set of active paths. This module calculates
the effective risk to the network for each path and traffic type.
Inputs
risk(n, T ) : N × T → R – the risk inherit to network device n for traffic of type T
(risk(n, T ) ≥ 1)




Given an active path p ∈ P with source s and sink t, the calculation proceeds by
partitioning the set of nodes of the path into three segments: the nodes “close” to the
source s, “close” to the sink t and the nodes “in between”. Closeness is characterized
by the function dk and is meant to capture any connected node over the logical
topology which sits no more that k hops away. Given this partition, flowRisk(p, T )
is:
flowRisk(p, T ) =
∑
i∈d2(s)∪d2(t) risk(i, T )
2+∑
i∈N(p)\(d2(s)∪d2(t)) risk(i, T )
2
We use k = 2 to model nodes on the same LAN. The rationale is to impart to source s
and sink t risk resulting from lateral movement of attacks. All other nodes contribute
to the overall path risk in proportion to the square of their own risks. We expect
in most networks for d2(s) and d2(t) to include nodes not directly on the path (like
nodes on the same LAN). The input path risk calculation flowRisk(p, T ) is modular
and can be augmented using other risk calculation methods.
4.3.3 Security Layer
The mathematical optimization model in the security layer is a mixed integer pro-
gramming model. We similarly present the inputs, variables, constraints, and objec-
tive for the security layer. Its inputs are given below. Also note that all the variables
from the functional model are constants.
Inputs
mem(n) : N → R – the memory resources of SDN device n
fwCost(T ) : T → R – the memory footprint for a firewall blocking traffic type T
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piCost – the memory footprint for a packet inspection post
fwComp – the complexity footprint for adding a firewall
piComp – the complexity footprint for adding a packet inspection post to the network
penalty(p, T ) : P × T → R – the penalty for blocking a unit of flow of type T along
path p
rank(n, p) : N ×P → Z – the position of node n in path p
flowRisk(p, T ) : P × T → R≥0 – above risk calculation
Variables
fwn,T ∈ {0, 1} – does a firewall block traffic type T at n
pin ∈ {0, 1} – is there packet inspection at network device n
fwORn,T ∈ {0, 1} – is there a block everything or block traffic of type T firewall at
network device n
fwOPp,T ∈ {0, 1} – is there a firewall on path p
rfp,T ∈ [0, 1] – risk factor for path p ∈ P (s, t) servicing flow (s, t, T ) ∈ F
RMfwp,n,T ∈ [0, 1] – used in the riskFactor calculation
RMpip,n,T ∈ [0, 1] – used in the riskFactor calculation
Constraints
fwORn,T = fwn,T ∨ fwn,∗,∀n ∈ N , T ∈ T (4.9)∑
T∈T ∪{∗}




(fwORn,T ),∀T ∈ T , p ∈ P : activep,T (4.11)
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RMfwp,n,T = 1− (.5)rank(n,p) · fwORn,T ,
∀p ∈ P (s, t), n ∈ N(p), (s, t, T ) ∈ F
(4.12)
RMpip,n,T = 1− 0.1 · (.5)rank(n,p) · pin,






∀T ∈ T , p ∈ P : activep,T
(4.14)
Equation 4.9 is used to define the presence of a firewall that will block traffic of type
T at a node n. Equation 4.10 ensures that the memory footprint in SDN node n for
the deployment of the firewall and the packet inspection logic does not exceed the
device memory. Equation 4.11 links the presence of a firewall that will block traffic
of type T on a path with the presence of a firewall that will block traffic of type T
on any node along the active path. Equation 4.12 defines the minimum risk factor
associated to a firewall. The earlier on the path the firewall is deployed, the lower







n,T fwComp · fwn,T +
∑





n loadn · pin+
β2
∑
p,T penalty(p, T ) · flowp,T · fwOPp,T+
β3
∑
p,T flowRiskp,T · rfp,T

(4.15)
The objective function defined in equation 4.15 is a weighted sum of four distinct
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terms that focus on minimizing the network complexity based on security resources
deployed, the load induced by inspection posts, the penalties incurred from dropping
desirable flows due to firewall placement and finally the residual risk. This model is
a classic mixed integer programming formulation.
4.3.4 Result Analysis
The result analysis module tries to generate cuts for the functional layer with the goal
of improving both functionality and security. To generate cuts, this module will form
equivalence classes of network nodes and pass back certain pairs of these classes, one
at a time, to the functional layer. Each pair of classes describes a segregation rule,
or a cut, to which to functional layer will adhere to as much as possible.
After the functional and security layers are re-optimized using the most recent
cut, the result analysis module determines whether the cut was beneficial or harmful
based on the objectives of each layer. If the cut is deemed to have been beneficial,
we permanently keep it as a constraint, repopulate the cut queue, and continue the
process.
If the cut is deemed to have been harmful, it is removed from the functional layer’s
constraint pool. Then the next cut in the queue will be passed back to the functional
layer. If the cut queue is empty, the feedback mechanism terminates and we output
the best solution found.
We note that since this process only provides pairs of nodes it is a heuristic. It
may be necessary for many nodes to simultaneously be separated to arrive at a global
optimum. This mechanism performed well in our experiments.
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4.3.5 Layer Coordination
It is valuable to review how the layers coordinate. The functional layer sends to the
security layer a set of paths that implements the routing within the network to serve
the specified flows while satisfying a set of segregation requirements. The security
layer first computes risks for these paths based on its knowledge of the traffic. The
paths, their risk and the security model are then tasked with deploying packet inspec-
tion apparatus as well as firewalls within that logical topology to monitor the traffic
and block threats (risky traffic). Once the security model is solved to optimality,
an analysis can determine whether the proposed logical topology is beneficial or not
(w.r.t. its objective) and even suggest further equivalence classes for network nodes
as well as segregation rules to be sent back to the functional layer for another iter-
ation. Fundamentally, the coordination signal boils down to additional equivalence
classes to group nodes together with segregation rules to separate paths that include
network nodes in “antagonistic” equivalence classes.
4.3.6 Outputs
When the set of potential cuts is empty, the proposed configuration can be parsed
and translated into SDN language fragments to be deployed on the network devices
in order to obtain the desired logical network topology put forth by our framework.
Within our sample network, we consider having two main types of devices: switches/routers
and hosts. In order to model traffic between internal and external entities we utilize
two gateway switches which represent the boundary of our network. For generality we
consider two traffic types (A and B) which could represent any type of traffic such as
web and storage. We also classify traffic as internal and external, with external traffic
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traversing one of the gateways. We allow only half of our hosts to communicate with
external sources by allowing them to connect to one of the two gateways. Further,
all hosts are involved in internal communications. In this instance we have 16 hosts
and we generated 60 flows, 44 of them being internal and 16 being external.
Additionally, our setup simulates an emergent vulnerability/active attack. We
select two hosts that are highly vulnerable to, or being targeted on, a specific type
of traffic, resulting in a significant increase in their risk for the corresponding type of
traffic. In particular, this could represent at DDoS attack on these two hosts.
We run multiple experiments providing the framework increasing numbers of start-
ing paths between source and destination (from the priming procedure) to determine
the impact on the solution quality.
Our implementation was built in Python 3.6 using the Gurobi 8.1 optimization
library [93]. The experiments were run on a machine running Ubuntu 18.04 and
equipped with an Intel Core i9-8950HK processor operating at 2.90 GHz with a 12
MB Cache and 32 GB of physical memory.
4.4 Evaluation/Results
We begin with the model’s resolution on the above scenario using the 10 shortest
paths per source and destination pair to prime the optimization. We assume equal
demand for each of the 60 flows and two high risk hosts (in red in Figure 4.3). In
each iteration the functional layer of the framework generates a candidate topology
and passes this solution to the security layer. The security layer then calculates the
network risk and deploys firewalls (represented with rectangles).
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of the Fat-Tree network after the first pass through both layers
of the framework (left) and the final configuration (right). Note: Firewalls are depicted
with rectangles, red nodes represent high risk nodes, green nodes represent nodes that are
initially blocked and recovered in the final configuration, utilizing the updated routes
shown in dashed lines. The modification of the logical topology allows for more intelligent
firewall placement balancing both functionality and security.
In the initial configuration, the gateway on the right serves both low risk (shown
in green) and high risk hosts (shown in red). Deploying a firewall on this gateway
significantly reduces the network risk and selected as optimal by the security layer.
Importantly, this results in collateral damage as flows to low risk hosts are blocked.
In total, the first iteration through the framework deploys 3 firewalls which block 12
flows, 8 of which are high risk.
Iteratively, the security layer proposes separation of these collateral nodes from
the high-risk nodes. The solution of the last framework iteration (493 candidates cuts
are proposed, 40 prove beneficial) is shown on the right. This configuration routes all
high risk flows through one core switch where a firewall is now deployed. Meanwhile,
all the low risk flows access the gateways through a separate core switch.
Overall we conducted six experiments with this configuration modifying only the
number of paths ({10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100}) being used to prime the functional layer
for each source-destination pair. Ultimately, this process will be dynamic and use
column-generation. Complete experimental results are shown in Table 4.1. A few
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10 paths 20 paths 30 paths 40 paths 50 paths 100 paths
Initial Flows Blocked 12 12 12 12 12 12
Final Flows Blocked 8 8 8 8 8 8
Initial Functional Objective 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012
Final Functional Objective 2014 2014 2014 2015 2014 2015
Cut Reward -8450 -4260 -7210 -4900 -5540 -3840
Initial Security Objective 13735 13724 13729 13723 13696 13726
Final Security Objective 13356 13356 13356 13356 13356 13348
Initial Network Risk 10425 10414 10419 10413 10386 10416
Final Network Risk 11646 11646 11646 11646 11646 11638
Functional Nodes Explored 370 55 206 83 510 46
Security Nodes Explored 1922 1650 152 30 28 19
Beneficial Cuts 40 20 34 23 26 18
Harmful Cuts 453 70 237 81 68 74
Iterations Needed 494 91 272 105 95 93
Time in Model (s) 283 40 319 112 76 273
Table 4.1: Experimental results from applying the DocSDN framework to an order 4
Fat-tree. Each column refers to a separate experiment where the number of paths per
source-destination pair given to the framework were varied. Note that the functional
objective values in this table are calculated without the cut reward, the second term in
Equation 4.8, in order to facilitate comparisons across columns.
observations are in order:
• The overall objective reflects both the functional and security layers. The other
objective rows refer to each layer objective individually. The network risk rows
quantify the risks and their change as the optimization proceeds. For instance,
for the 10 paths benchmark, the risk degrades from 10425 to 11646 or 11.7% as
a result of supporting an additional 4 good flows.
• The “nodes explored” rows indicate of the size of the branch and bound tree
and remains quite modest throughout.
• Within each experiment we observe a meaningful search, as seen by numerous
cuts sent back to the functional layer, to segregate high and low risk flows.
• All runs blocked all flows that contain a high risk host while preserving the
low risk flows. All experiments delivered final configurations that preserved the
same low-risk flows. We therefore hypothesize that a column-generation would
quickly settle down and prove that no additional path can improve the quality
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of the solution. It is nonetheless interesting that adding more paths does not
negatively impact the overall runtime.
• The objective functions of the functional and security layers use “scores” meant
to ease the interplay between the two. Yet, it is wise to consult the raw proper-
ties of the solutions to appreciate the impact of the optimization. In particular,
the number of flows blocked and the network risks. What is readily apparent is
that improving functionality induces a slight degradation in the network risks,
underlying the conflicting nature of the two objectives. The individual objective
scores while moving in the correct direction are not to be viewed as stand alone
metrics to determine solution quality but rather inter layer communications
indicating improvement or decline from a functional or security perspective.
• The objective scores vary across our experiments due to the stochasticity intro-
duced by our heuristic-driven feedback module (see Section 4.3.4 for discussion).
For instance, the functional objecive in the 30 path experiment is slightly worse
than it is in other runs, but this difference does not impact the number of
serviced flows in the final configuration.
• The variance in time, iterations and number of cuts produced by each exper-
iment is due to symmetries in the formulation. Solutions that are symmetric
in the functional layer may not be symmetric in the security layer and induce
slightly different solutions there. This is especially true for a Fat-tree network
due to its built in redundancy/symmetry.
• Beneficial cuts reflects the number of segregation proposals from the security
layers that are adopted by the functional layer (these cuts remove the current
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best feasible solution). harmful cuts are segregation proposals that do not “cut”
the current best feasible solution or worsen the functional solution.
4.5 Conclusion
Our framework is portable with respect to network risk assessment. Since the risk
calculation/analysis is decoupled from the optimization model, the framework can be
combined with any procedure that calculates risk on a per path basis. Along with this
procedure, the other requirements for implementing a different risk mechanism are 1)
A way of evaluating how risk changes due to the deployment of network defenses and
2) The ability to propose candidate cuts that can be passed to the functional layer.
Our results show it is possible to effectively, automatically, and quickly find a
network configuration that meets multiple conflicting properties. Our framework is
modular, enabling integration of new desired properties. DocSDN will allow net-
work administrators to effectively prioritize and choose their desired properties. The
efficiency of DocSDN is enabled by the feedback/interplay between the functional
and security optimization layers.
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Chapter 5
Functionality and Security -
Integrated Framework
5.1 Introduction
Network engineers rely on network appliances to assess the network state (load, good
and bad data flows, congestion,...) and public vulnerability databases and security
appliances to understand risk. Network engineers have to integrate both sources to
assess the overall risk posture of the network and decide what to do.
Due to the intractability of this job, vulnerabilities exist in enterprise networks for
long periods: recent work found it can take over 6 months to achieve 90% patching [69]
(similar findings in prior studies [107]). Furthermore, some vulnerabilities are publicly
disclosed before patches are available or tested, creating a vulnerability window where
patching cannot help. The goal of this work is adjust the network in this vulnerability
window to mitigate risk and maximize functionality.
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(Probabilistic) Attack graphs are used to model risk [106]. An attack graph is a
labeled transition system that models an adversary’s capabilities within a network
and how those can be elevated by transitioning to new states via the exploitation
of vulnerabilities (e.g., a weak password, a bug in a software package, the ability
to guess a stack address,...). In this work, we focus on risk that is due to network
configuration. See, for example, the TREsPASS project for how to incorporate other
aspects of risk [76].
Attack graphs can be used to discover paths that an adversary may use to escalate
his privileges to compromise a given target (e.g., customer database or an adminis-
trator account). Estimations of the probabilities of success of paths coupled with the
value of the targets characterize the risk assumed by the network owner [36,64].
Deciding how to mitigate risk is more delicate. While modern attack graphs
can issue recommendations that indicate which edges are most critical [10, 36, 54,
55, 96, 98, 105] (which exploits should be patched, where a firewall must be stood
up, etc...) to decrease the overall risk in the network, they do not account for the
loss in functionality (i.e., the collateral damage) that they induce. Furthermore,
recommendations must be implemented manually increasing response time. A more
desirable scenario to cope with emerging threats is:
1. A security appliance identifies a problematic flow/user (signaling a change in a
component’s risk) or a new vulnerability is published in CVE (Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures) [32],
2. An attack graph is generated,
3. Recommendations are derived from the resulting graph, and
4. Recommendations are programmatically deployed and implemented
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The challenge to deliver this vision is threefold: first, to evaluate attack graphs
quickly; second, to incorporate functionality requirements and; third, to quickly and
transparently deploy recommended changes.
Our contribution Our contribution is an optimization framework we call Fashion
(Functional and Attack graph Secured HybrId Optimization of virtualized Networks).
Fashion considers both functionality and security when deciding how to configure
the network. The functional layer treats network traffic as a multi-commodity data
flow problem and provides the logic to route flows. It ensures that any routing solu-
tion carries each flow from its source to its destination (if the flow is not dropped due
to a security layer decision), respects link capacities and network device throughputs,
and satisfies the required demand. To enable the security layer, we introduce security
metric which can be evaluated using linear programming to deliver quick calculation
of risk on related networks. The security layer then integrates the risk of a configu-
ration to create a joint model between the two layers. This joint model (solved with
integer linear programming) focuses on reconfiguring the network. All Fashion code
is available at [23].
The risk measure A major problem in attack graphs is their scalability [9,94] as
they consider all paths an attacker could take to achieve their objective. Two common
graph representations are an attack dependency graph and an attack state graph. In
the dependency view each node represents an exploit or a capability in the network.
The main drawback of the dependency representation is that analysis of overall risk is
difficult. The second representation is the attack state graph. In this representation
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each node represents an attacker’s current capabilities. This representation simplifies
analysis; however, an exponential blowup in representation size makes it prohibitively
expensive for moderate size networks [50,94].
Several works have used optimization to create attack graph recommendations [36,
67]. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no analysis of attack dependency
graphs which is conducive to repeated evaluation on related graphs (differing by the
introduction of a defensive countermeasure or a new flow). Fashion must quickly
consider many functionality and security considerations, meaning that state of the
art recommendation engines are too slow. Instead, we develop an approximation of
a prior measure described by Wang et al. [121] (described in Sec. 5.2) and consists of
a weighted sum of two parts:
Reach: The total impact of the nodes that are reachable by the attacker. This trans-
lates to an attack graph where each nonzero probability edge is assumed to
be compromised. The first generation of attack graphs considered this mea-
sure [56, 60,94,112].
Path: The risk (impact times likelihood) of the maximum path in the network. Prior
work by Khouzani et al. [64] used this measure in attack state graphs (see
Section 5.1).
Since this is an approximation, one may wish to validate the output of fashion using
the full risk measure or existing network security or functionality appliances (see
Figure 5.1). If a validation tool does not approve the configuration, it may be possible
to programmatically incorporate its output. If the tool outputs an important flow
that is not being served, the value of this flow can be increased in the configuration
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(see an example in Table 5.1). If the tool outputs a flow that should not be served,
the risk of the endpoint can be increased in the configuration.
To understand the quality of our metric when evaluating Fashion (Section 5.4),
we use Wang et al.’s algorithm as ground truth for the evaluating the security of our
resulting configurations. In all generated instances our metric of avg(Reach,Path) is
monotonic in Wang et al’s algorithm (which is far too slow to be used in an opti-
mization). Fashion usually outputs a configuration in under 30 minutes, allowing
response to short term events (on networks with 432 hosts and 181 networking de-
vices). Our approach can incorporate the idea of equivalence classes used in previous
attack graph research to further improve scaling [55].
Integrating Fashion To address the deployment challenges, we focus on soft-
ware defined networks (SDN) and recommendations that can be implemented through
control APIs of SDN controllers. For concreteness, we evaluate our approach on
data-center networks which frequently use virtualized networking [5]. Fashion is not
applicable for all networks at all times. Fashion is not an “add on” to the existing
infrastructure of a legacy system.
Fashion’s output is fed to a tool which creates a high-level SDN controller imple-
menting the configuration. Specifically, Fashion’s output interfaces with a Frenetic
controller [44]. Figure 5.1 shows how Fashion fits into a network deployment pipeline.
It can be rerun anytime there is a change in the environmental setup.
We assume white list routing where only desirable flows are carried to their des-
tination. This corresponds to all extraneous flows in the network already not being

































Figure 5.1: Fashion takes as input the existing physical topology, required flows
(including bandwidth and value), and vulnerabilities. The Fashion optimizer outputs a
JSON file describing how to route flows in the network (and flows that should be blocked).
This JSON is fed to our Python Frenetic Translation Engine which interacts with the
Frenetic controller to create the necessary Openflow tables in the SDN devices.
functionality and security. That is, any reduction in risk corresponds to a reduction
in functionality. If one has an attack graph that routes using flows that are not
necessary to functionality, this routing can be disabled at no cost to functionality.
Furthermore, we assume devices can use source routing which allows more flexibility
in our security decisions and ability to respect capacity. We consider routing between







(c) Security config. (d) Balanced Config.
Figure 5.2: Output of optimization model on sample network when considering
functionality only, security only, and both. The set of required flows and existing exploits
are shown in Table 5.1 and the corresponding attack graph in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.2a
shows the set of available network links that can be used by the optimization framework.
Figure 5.2b shows the output of the model when considering only functionality
requirements, Figure 5.2c shows the output when considering only security requirements,
and Figure 5.2d shows a solution respecting both requirements.
Driving Example We now describe a toy example that is used to illustrate
Fashion’s key concepts. Recall that the objective of the framework is to produce a
collection of decisions to configure the network devices (routers, firewalls, ...) to serve
the functional requirements while minimizing the risks incurred by the network. In
this work we consider routing decisions on flows only (including blocking a flow).
Figure 5.2a illustrates the physical layer of the network.1 It features 3 SDN
appliances, nodes 0, 1 and 2 that route traffic as well as block it (act as firewalls). The
toy network features 4 hosts, 3 through 6. This mini network can support different
paths between the SDN appliance 0 and any host (e.g., host 3).
This physical network must be configured to serve traffic demands. Table 5.1
shows a collection of data flows in the form s → t conveying that traffic emanating
from node s must reach node t. Each data flow has a type (here A or B). Each data
1The following conventions are used: circle are routers, square are hosts, and black lines are
physical connections.
73
src → dst type value
0 → 3 A $$$
3 → 4 A $
3 → 4 B $
3 → 5 A $$
3 → 5 B $




(6,0: A), (5,1) (6,1)
(4,0: B), (3,1) (4,1)

























Figure 5.3: Attack graph for network in Figure 5.2
flow also carries an economic value shown by the number of $ signs. Table 5.1 also
shows exploits, each exploit has one or more pre-conditions to be triggered as well as
effects. A pair (h, p) states that the adversary secured capability p on host h where
the ordered set of capabilities is {0, 1}. Privilege level 0 represents the ability to send
traffic to that host, it is augmented with the traffic type (either A or B). For the toy
example, we assume all exploits have probability 1 of being achieved if preconditions
are met.
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Figures 5.2b-5.2d show possible outputs of the framework, i.e., a configuration
that defines routing tables for each SDN appliance (including explicit firewalls). In
this network configuration, the following conventions are added: gray nodes block
traffic, black (resp. blue) arrows are type A flows (resp. B), and dashed arrows
represent blocked traffic.
Figure 5.3 conveys the attack graph for this network.2 For instance, from having
capability 0 on host 0 (the entry point) one can transition to having capability 0 on
host 3 (host 3 is reachable from SDN device 0). The red diamond node exploit 0
shows that exploiting the vulnerability on host 3 will deliver a privilege escalation,
i.e., capability 1 on host 3. Figure 5.2b shows a configuration resulting from Fashion
in which the objective was exclusively the maximization of the functional objective
(total flow). All data flows are served and no counter-measures are deployed, leaving
the network exposed to an adversary as shown by the existences of paths that reach
the target nodes (6, 1) and (4, 1) (in Fig. 5.3).
Alternatively, Figure 5.2c conveys a configuration at the opposite end of the spec-
trum where security is paramount. The attack graph in Figure 5.3 shows that the
easiest way to block access to the 4 exploit nodes is to sever the edge b (0 → 3).
Indeed, if one cannot reach host 3, exploit 0 is not usable and the hosts 4 and 5
are unreachable preventing the attacker from leveraging exploits 1 through 3. In
Figure 5.2c node 0 is now blocking all traffic of type “A.” In this configuration, the
internal traffic proceeds unabated. However, the high “commercial” value of flow
0 → 3 was not respected doing great damage to the economic value of the network
2Figure 5.3 uses the following conventions: 1) the square node is the entry point of the network,
2) green square NET nodes represent network reachability, 3) diamond nodes are exploits, 4) circle
nodes are (host,privilege) states, 5) black (resp. blue) arrows correspond to network connection of
type A (resp. B), 6) incoming red links are precondition states of exploits, and 7) outgoing red links
are postcondition states of exploits.
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service.
Finally, in Figure 5.2d the interplay between competing priorities become appar-
ent. In this solution, the flow 0→ 3 is served because of its intrinsic economic value
while edges d and e in the attack graph (corresponding to routing 3 → 4 : B and
3→ 5 : A respectively) are turned off. More precisely, these flows are routed to node
2 which is a firewall for both traffic types as shown in Figure 5.2d. This is done
to prevent the attacker traversing edges h and i and then being able to use exploits
1, 2, 3. This unconventional placement of countermeasures prevents an adversary from
reaching the capability nodes (6, 1) and (4, 1) while still preserving the most valuable
flow.
Further related work Attack graphs are not a panacea. Major criticisms of
attack graphs include the difficulty finding the necessary inputs [4, 97], the difficulty
in implementing the output recommendations [78], and scaling issues. Fashion’s
risk model is designed for fast evaluation on related networks. As necessary, one can
include more expensive risk metrics in Configuration Validation before deploying the
resulting configuration. Indeed, to implement the attack graph recommendation, it
is necessary to interpret its output, a task deemed too difficult and too remote from
the network to be actionable [19]. Fashion is designed to address this problem.
Scalability remains a limitation (further discussion in Section 5.5). The size of at-
tack graphs is a weakness, driving the time it takes to generate and analyze them. The
evolution of networking environments towards SDN provides the perfect opportunity
for integration with attack graphs. SDN offers a centralized control and holistic view
of the network no longer requiring external scanning tools to discover reachability
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data [39].
Researchers have proposed high-level SDN programming languages in order to
efficiently express packet-forwarding policies and ensure correctness when dealing
with overlapping rules [44, 101]. These languages focus on parallel and sequential
composition of policies to ensure modularity while providing correctness guarantees.
Importantly, when our framework proposes a set of new rules for the controller it is
necessary to ensure that good traffic is not lost [102].
To aid in network configuration, research tools assess network reachability [65],
network security risk [106, 126], and link contention [114, 122]. These tools assess
the quality of a configuration with respect to a single property and do not provide
recommendations.
Recent tools generate network configurations from a set of functional and secu-
rity requirements [14, 38, 81, 89, 117]. Captured security requirements include IPSec
tunneling, allowing only negotiated packet flows, and ensuring identical rule sets on
all firewalls.
Our work can be seen as unifying two recent works, one by Curry et al. [33] and
another by Khouzani et al. [64]. Curry et al. proposed an optimization framework for
deciding on a network configuration based on the given desired network functionality
of data flows and the underlying physical network. Curry et al. showed how to
produce a network configuration that meets all demands while blocking adversarial
traffic. In their model, each network node has an input risk and nodes assume a
fraction of the risk of any node with which they share a path. However, their risk
measure does not take into account the ability of an adversary to pivot in the network.
Khouzani et al. [64] created an optimization engine designed to minimize security
risk as represented by an attack graph. They show how to formulate the most effective
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attack path of an attack graph using a linear program. Their functionality view is
limited to imparting an explicit numeric functional cost to each remedial action. It
is unclear how to create these input costs used in the model or what to do if the
functional requirements are non-linear. Importantly, Khouzani et al.’s formulation
requires attack state graph. In practice, attack state graphs are exponential in the
size of the network, as each set of capabilities is a distinct node [50]. Our Path measure
also captures the maximum likelihood path. However, since our measure operates on
an attack dependency graph it corresponds to a different property. We discuss this in
the Section 5.2.
Organization The organization of this work proceeds as follows. Section 5.2
introduces background on attack graphs and on the measures we will optimize over,
Section 5.3 documents the optimization model, Section 5.4 evaluates Fashion, and
Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Attack Graphs
Fashion’s goal is to balance the functionality and security needs of the network.
Functionality needs are relatively straightforward to state: a set of desired network
flows that should be carried in the network while respecting link capacity. Security
is more complicated to state. We use the abstraction of attack graphs.
Attack graphs model the most likely paths that an attacker could use to penetrate
a network [9, 56, 106, 112]. In the attack graph model attackers traverse the network
to reach their target(s) network resource. This traversal may combine traditional
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network capability such as routing with exploitation of a software/hardware vulner-
ability. An attack graph assumes an attacker starts at some entry point such as a
publicly facing Web page and through a series of privilege escalations and network
device accesses pivots to eventually reach his or her desired destination. (The tech-
nology supports an arbitrary starting point if one wishes to consider insider attacks.)
We focus our discussion here on attack dependency graphs as defined by Homer et
al. [51]. Another common type of graph is called an attack state graph. We discuss
the distinction between these two data structures in Section 5.2.1. For brevity, we
just refer to attack dependency graphs as attack graphs.
There are two types of nodes in an attack graph: capabilities, denoted C, and
exploits denoted as ex. An exploit requires some number of capabilities as precondi-
tions. If an attacker has successfully obtained those preconditions they are assumed
to gain all successors of ex with some probability. Example capabilities include ability
to send packets, user level authority, root level authority. Example exploits include
an SQL injection which requires an ability to send packets and a SQL server run-
ning a specific software version. A successor of this exploit node may be root level
access on the device running the SQL server. In the attack graph in Figure 5.3, when
an attacker executes Exploit 0, they achieve privilege level 1 on node 3 with some
probability.
Building an attack graph requires network reachability information, device soft-
ware configurations and known exploit information [32, 41, 86, 92] to generate the
graph. Attack graphs are only effective in measuring how an attacker would traverse
using known vulnerabilities and system state. While it is possible to consider the
implications of a new vulnerability [55] this is not a native capability.
In isolation a misconfigured device which allows unauthorized access may be be-
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nign but when coupled with network access to ex-filtrate data or pivot to additional
targets the results can be devastating. The goal of constructing and analyzing an
attack graph is to understand the security posture in total. An attack graph should
allow one to understand defensive weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in the net-
work. Since all enterprises have limited budgets, the goal of this analysis is usually
to prioritize changes that have the largest impact.
5.2.1 The size of attack graphs
Since their introduction, a major problem in attack graphs is their scalability [9,94].
They consider all paths an attacker could take to achieve their objective. There are
two very different ways of representing the graph that are called an attack dependency
graph and an attack state graph. In the dependency view each node represents an
exploit or capability in the network. It may be possible to achieve a capability using
many different paths. Furthermore, multiple conditions may be necessary to achieve
this capability, for example, network reachability of a database machine and a SQL
injection attack. This is the view presented in Figure 5.3.
In the most general form, each exploit has an associated Boolean structure (in-
dicating when the exploit can be obtained) and a probability (indicating attacker
success rate in carrying out the exploit). Capability nodes are annotated with an im-
pact value that signifies the cost of an adversary achieving that capability (following
the NIST cybersecurity framework guidance [91]). In this work, we focus on exploits
that are AND and OR prerequisites (and not arbitrary Boolean formulae). Note the
dependency representation may have cycles. The main drawback of the dependency
representation is that analysis of overall risk is difficult. Even if one assumes that
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probability associated with each edge is independent, calculating the overall proba-
bility requires consideration of all paths, and there may be infinite paths from the
starting point to a target if the graph has cycles. We return to this problem after de-
scribing the state representation and prior work on quickly evaluating attack graphs
on similar enterprises.
The second representation is the attack state graph. In this representation each
node represents an attacker’s current capabilities. Suppose there are k capabilities in
the network. In the state representation, there are 2k nodes representing whether the
attack currently has each of the capabilities 1, ..., k. In the dependency representation,
the attack graph has k capability nodes and some number of exploit nodes. This rep-
resentation is acyclic and makes it very easy to carry out analysis [50]. However, an
exponential blowup in representation size makes it prohibitively expensive for mod-
erate size graphs [50]. Khouzani et al’s model [64] requires the state representation
to minimize risk.
5.2.2 Evaluating related attack graphs
In this work we focus on the ability to repeatedly evaluate an attack graph on related
networks. The ability to perform this analysis quickly is critical to utilizing attack
graphs in our optimization framework. The ability to regenerate the attack graph
multiple times at decreased cost has been addressed recently in related contexts.
Almohri et al. [8] considered an attack graph setting where the defender has in-
complete knowledge of the network. An example source of this uncertainty is mobile
device movement. They then construct attack graphs using a probabilistic model
which includes the uncertainties in network configuration. In our setting, we are try-
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ing to find the best configuration under a variety of settings, Almohri el al. would be
appropriate if the functionality and security requirements could not be unified as it
could provide recommendations under a variety of related functional settings.
Frigault and Wang [46] argue that it is inaccurate to measure probabilities with a
fixed probability of exploit. They argue that factors such as patches being available
will decrease the threat while wide spread distribution of vulnerability details may
increase the threat. As such, they conduct attack graph analysis where the graph is
static but probabilities can change over time. Poolsappasit et al. [98] also argue that
the probability of attack success changes over time.
Note that if one is willing to consider a complete attack graph then all changes
in the graph can be represented with a change in probability. However, this is akin
to considering the state representation as one needs to consider an edge from each
subset of nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, Khouzani et al.’s work is the only work that considers
defensive actions that can drastically change the attack graph and a formulation of
the risk calculation graph that is amenable to optimization. However, their model is
inherently tied to the state graph representation.
5.2.3 Formalizing the problem
This section defines the risk measure used as ground truth in Fashion. The metric
is drawn from Wang et al. [121] augmented with impact for each node. Wang et al.’s
metric assumes an attack graph where the probability of achieving each exploit is in-
dependent. Since paths in an attack graph often overlap, the probability of achieving
prerequisites of an exploit may not be independent. This simplifying assumption is
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often used since considering correlated probabilities makes the problem significantly
harder [51]. Consider the following notation:
• Let EX = EXn∪EXv be the set of all exploits with EXn the network reachability
exploits (to model a configurable network) and EXn be the set of vulnerabilities.
– Further assume that EX = EXAND ∪ EXOR, i.e., the set of exploits can be
partitioned into conjunctive or disjunctive nodes.
– Assume that EXn ⊆ EXOR, i.e., reachability is treated as OR between
multiple traffic types among hosts.
– Exploits ex ∈ EX, carry a probability p(ex) of exploitability given that all
prerequisites have been satisfied. It can be estimated using vulnerability
databases [32, 41, 92]. Note that p(ex) is a component metric, we seek to
capture the cumulative risk in the network (see discussion in [113,121]).
• Let C be the set of all capabilities in the network. A capability C carries an
impact Pact(C) ∈ R+ ∪ {0}.
• Let N = EX ∪ C denote a node set.
• Let E = Rr ∪Ri denote the edge set with
– Rr ⊆ C× EX : the exploit’s prerequisites.
– Ri ⊆ EX× C : capabilities gained from an exploit.
There are no edges in C× C or EX× EX.
• An attack graph G(N,E) is a directed graph.
• Let Start ⊆ C denote a set of capabilities that the adversary is believed to have.
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For any node n, Pred(n) = {v|(v, n) ∈ E} denotes all its predecessors in G, while
Succ(n) = {v|(n, v) ∈ E} denotes all of its successors.
Basic Risk First, consider how to compute the overall risk in the absence of cycles.
This discussion heavily follows Wang et al.’s [121] methodology. Their formulation is
centered on Bayesian inference and is augmented with an impact for each capability
node.
The primary goal is to compute cumulative scores P (ex) and P (c) for each node
in G. These represent the likelihood that an attacker reaches the specified node in




P (c) ∗ Pact(c) (5.1)
To compute P (·) first consider the acyclic case. For AND nodes, the cumulative score
is the product of all predecessors and p(ex). For OR nodes, the cumulative score is the
sum of all predecessors component score minus the product of each pair of probability
scores (using Bayesian reasoning). All capability nodes are treated as OR nodes. For






x∈X′ p(x) X 6= ∅
0 X = ∅
.
Definition 5.2.1 (Network Risk). [121, Definition 2] Given an acyclic attack graph
G and any component score assignment function p : EX −→ [0, 1] , the cumulative
3It is possible to assign individual component scores p(c) for nodes c ∈ C. In this work we assume
that p(c) = 1 ∀ c ∈ C. Without loss of generality, we assume that all uncertainty in the attacker’s
success is represented in exploit edges.
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c∈Pred(ex) P (c) ex ∈ EXAND
p(ex) · Bayes(Pred(ex)) ex ∈ EXOR
P (c) =

1 c ∈ Start
Bayes(Pred(c)) otherwise.
Note that P (n) can be computed for all n ∈ N as long G is acyclic. P (n) can
be computed once P (e) is known for all e ∈ Pred(n). Thus, there exists at least one
topological ordering that allows this computation (and all topological orderings result
in the same computation). For a given acyclic attack graph let algorithm ARisk(G)
compute P (ni) for ni ∈ N .
Handling Cycles The adaptation of Wang et al’s [121] to handles cycles is used to
evaluate security measures introduced in subsection 5.2.4. Wang et al. [121] observed
that:
1. Cycles with no entry point can be safely ignored and all nodes can be set to 0
likelihood.
2. We only need to measure the probability for the first visit of a node. Consider
a cycle with only one incoming edge. Denote by n the node with the incoming
edge. We can safely compute P (n) and ignore the cycle as any path that
traverses the cycle will have already included n. Thus, the edge closing the
cycle at n can be ignored.
3. Cycles with multiple entry points are more delicate to handle and require the
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removal of an edge from the graph. The key insight is no path that an attacker
traverses will actually follow the cycle. Different paths will include subsets of
edges from the cycle.
Wang et al. [121] propose the following methodology for handling cycles with mul-
tiple entry points. Assume that all nodes that can be topologically sorted have been
and their cumulative probabilities are assigned. Let X be a cycle with at least two
entry points. For each entry point x ∈ X one can compute P (x) without considering
Succ(x). While x’s successors are important in calculating the overall risk they do
not impact P (x). Compute a new attack graph G′ which has all Succ(x) removed and
use it to calculate P (x). Importantly, the graph G′ may still have cycles which inhibit
computation of P (x) but this process can be done inductively. Once it terminates it is
repeated for all entry points in the cycle. Once all entry points have their likelihood,
the rest of the cycle can be safely evaluated and ARisk continues.
Some parts of the computation can be reused throughout the recursion (all nodes
that were sorted before the cycle was encountered) but the likelihoods computed in
this process for x′ 6= x are not the true likelihoods and cannot be reused between
recursive steps.
When the paper uses the term Risk(G) it refers to this metric and calculation.
As discussed in Section 5.4 the algorithm is too slow to be incorporated into an
optimization framework that is considering many possible solutions. The Python
implementation has been open-sourced along with the rest of Fashion [23].
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5.2.4 Approximating Risk
In order to incorporate cumulative risk into an optimization framework, we turn
to approximations of risk that can be linearized. The risk calculation presented in
Definition 5.2.1 and its augmentation for handling cycles is non-linear. To the best of
our knowledge, even a closed form of the calculated value is not known. We consider
two approximations to serve as proxies. After introducing these approximations, we
remark on the strengths and weaknesses of both of these approximations and why
they complement each other well. We defer to Section 5.4 to remark on quality of
our measures.
We call these two approximations Reachability and Max attack. The qualitative
differences in the two approximations may make either measure (or a combination)
appropriate for a given set of network parameters (scale of network, traffic, pattern,
vulnerabilities).




1 P (n) > θ
0 P (n) ≤ θ
The value θ is a threshold used to determine whether a capability should either be
ignored or considered attained. We consider θ = 0. Since p(n) ∈ {0, 1}, we can







P ∗(c) ∗ Pact(c) (5.2)
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Utilizing the binary representation of exploits in Equation 5.2 is an approxima-
tion, measuring how an attacker can impact a target network. Since we consider
θ = 0 this measures the total impact of nodes reachable by the adversary. This is
equivalent to calculating the weighted size of the connected components in G that
contains Start. The first generation of attack graphs did not consider annotate nodes
with probability and measured this quantity [103, 112]. This models the worst case
approach when calculating attacker compromise of network capabilities and assumes
that the all vulnerabilities with probability of exploitation above a threshold will be
successfully exploited.
However, this approach does have a weakness when the goal is to jointly optimize
functionality and security. Consider two nodes a and b where Pact(a) = 2 ∗ Pact(b).
Further suppose, at least a or b must remain in the connected component to sat-
isfy functionality demands. The reachability metric will prioritize disconnecting b.
However, it may be that the attacker is less likely to reach b and this decision is not
optimum. This may be the case even if p(b) ≥ p(a) (it is possible that P (a) > P (b)
even in this case due to the likelihood of reaching their predecessors).
Max Attack The second risk measurement we introduce is the attacker’s most
likely course of action. This measure is based on Khouzani et al.’s most effective
attack measure [64]. We introduce the measure first and then say how our approach
differs from Khouzani et al.
Let σ be the attacker’s starting point in the attack graph. We define ωσ→c to be
the set of all paths, where a path is sequence of edges (e1, . . . , ek) such that ei ∈ E,
from σ to c in the attack graph. Let Λc ∈ [0, 1] be the normalized impact of an










Instead of having multiple targets, an auxiliary target µ is considered, that will
be the sole target capability of the attacker. To do this, edges from each c ∈ C to
an auxiliary exploit exc are introduced, such that p(exc) = Λc. Then we introduce an






However network defenses can be deployed in order to reduce the probabilities of these
exploits. Let xd ∈ {0, 1} be a binary decision variable denoting whether a network
defense d has been deployed. Let pd(ex) be the reduced probability of exploit ex due
to network defense d. With this, the probability of exploit ex with respect to network
defense decision xd is given by
pxd(ex) = p(ex)(1− xd) + pd(ex)xd. (5.5)
Therefore we want to minimize the risk due to the most effective path risk over all
the possible configurations of network defenses available. This approach identifies
appropriate locations to deploy network defenses in order to protect both high value
capabilities with low exploitablity as well as lower value, more exploitable assets.
We will incorporate these defense decisions when defining our optimization model in
section 5.3.
Note that Path does not distinguish between a graph with 2 paths with the same
underlying probability and a single path with that probability. In addition to this
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inaccuracy (that was present in Khouzani et al.’s work) working on the attack depen-
dency graph introduces two sources of error:
1. Path only counts the impact from the last node on the path. This is because
it is only measuring the probability of a path and the impact is added as a
“last layer” in the graph. So it doesn’t distinguish between two paths (of equal
probability) where one path has intermediate nodes with meaningful impact.
In the attack state representation each node has the current capabilities of the
attack and thus impact of this node set can be added as a last layer.
2. The path used to determine Path may not be exploitable by an adversary due to
AND nodes. That is, the path may include a node with multiple prerequisites
and the measure only computes the probability of exploiting a single prerequi-
site. In the attack state representation there are no AND nodes so this problem
does not arise.
Balancing Reach and Path. As described above both Reach and Path have inherent
weaknesses. We believe (and demonstrate in Section 5.4) that Fashion outputs better
solutions when considering both metrics. We call the weighted sum of these two
functions Hybrid. This is because Reach and Path mitigate each other’s weaknesses.
However, even a joint optimization over both metrics is still heuristic.
Reach is effective at isolating nodes that don’t need to communicate. However,
when there is a tie between two nodes that could be excluded, Reach may not make
the right decision because it does not know the likelihood of reaching these nodes.
However, Path’s measure can effectively break ties on which node to remove based on
the maximum likelihood path that reaches the node.
Path is effective at isolating nodes that have a high probability path to them.
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Yet, this measure does not account for the other nodes compromised “on the way”
to the target node. By minimizing the total weighted reachable set using Reach this
weakness is partially mitigated. Similarly, if two paths have similar probability but
one contains multiple AND prerequisites, it may have a larger reachable component,
enabling Reach to again break ties.
5.3 Optimization Model
This section highlights the content and structure of the optimization model used
to obtain network configurations that uphold a balance between functionality and
security.
The optimization model is a binary integer programming (BIP) model as all deci-
sion variables are binary. The model contains two components dedicated, respectively,
to the modeling of the data network and its job as a carrier for data flows and to the
representation of the attack graph and the modeling of induced risk measures Reach
and Path. The core decision variables fall in two categories.
First, Boolean variables modeling the routing decisions of the data flows in the
network are associated to network links and subjected to flow balance equations as
well as link capacity constraints that capture the valid delivery of flows and the
functional rewards associated to those deliveries based on the flow values.
Second, Boolean variables are associated to the deployment of counter-measures
in the network. In this work, counter-measures are routing a flow to a firewall (rather
than its destination). Auxiliary Boolean variables are introduced to facilitate the
expression of the model and setup channeling constraints that tie the attack graph
91
model to the network routing model so that routing as well as blocking decisions
are conveyed to the attack graph side and result in severing arcs that express pre-
conditions of exploits.
While the constraints devoted to capturing reachability, i.e., Reach, are relatively
straightforward, the modeling of the most effective path, i.e., Path is more delicate
for two reasons. First, it requires the use of products of probabilities held in variables
yielding a non-linear formulation. Thankfully, that challenge can be side-stepped
by converting those products into sums with a logarithmic transform. Second, it
delivers a min−max problem that needs to be dualized to recover a conventional
minimization.
The objective function combines (linearly) two linear expressions capturing the
functional objective and the risk objective. Both are weighted with a parameter α
that allows the model user to play with the risk-functionality trade-off. Namely, the
objective is of the form minα · Of + (1−α) · Os where Of is the functional objective
and Os is the risk objective.
The risk objective Os is itself a linear combination of three components:
Od The cost of the security measures
β1 · Or The weighted Reach risk
β2 · Op The weighted Path risk.
Notably, using β1 = 0, β2 = 1 delivers a model that exclusively consider Path as its risk
measure while β1 = 1, β2 = 0 focuses exclusively on the Reach risk measure. Without
loss of generality, let β = β1 and β2 = 1 − β with β ∈ [0, 1]. The parameterization
gives a hybrid risk measure based on a convex combination of Path and Reach. Two
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key parameters of the optimization models are, therefore, α and β that control the
functionality-risk tradeoff and the balance between Path and Reach measures.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section we show the efficacy and efficiency of Fashion. The goal is to under-
stand (i) does Fashion produce configurations that effectively balance functionality
and security? and (ii) does Fashion produce configurations quickly, and what time
scale of events can Fashion respond to?
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
The evaluation is made on a Linux machine with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 2.00
GHz and 64GB of RAM.
Network Topology The network topology is as described in chapter 1 discussion
of Fat-tree. The benchmarks include small to medium sized instances. The largest
instance tested, includes 613 devices (hosts and SDN devices) and 1332 links between
these.
Network Traffic Network traffic is as described in Chapter 1 with specific consider-
ations for this chapter as follows. For considered instances, the number of traffic type
varies from 1 to 3. One-third of the instances have 1 traffic type, one-third of the
instances have 2 traffic types and the one-third of instances have three traffic types.
The number of flows per host is varied across benchmarks with steps {1, 3, 5, 10} to
vary network utilization [35,61].
Vulnerabilities Synthetic vulnerabilities are injected on hosts within the network.
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The generation adopts several components from the vulnerability model presented
the recent CVSS 3.1 Base metrics focusing on exploitability and impact [41]. The
percentage of exploitable hosts ranges in {10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%} and the average
number of vulnerabilities per host (1-5) drives the total number of vulnerabilities
injected. The number of vulnerabilities per host is representative of Zhang et al ’s
findings [130] from scans of publicly available VMs after patching was performed.
Each vulnerability has one or more prerequisite conditions and a single post condi-
tion of privilege escalation (if successfully exploited). Each vulnerability is uniformly
assigned a score [0 − 1] representing the probability of exploitation. Three privilege
levels {0, 1, 2} are assumed with 0 denoting networking reachability.
Each generated exploit has a single precondition with probability .50, two pre-
conditions with probability .25, and three preconditions with probability .25. Pro-
cedurally, the single precondition exploits are generated at random from selected
exploitable hosts, each allowing the escalation of a single step in privilege level. If
the required number of single precondition exploits exceeds the number of exploitable
hosts additional hosts are infected. The multi-precondition exploits are generated by
selecting one prerequisite randomly from the pool of existing (single precondition)
exploits and generating a new exploit which increases the privilege of one of the in-
put exploits, the other prerequisites are selected randomly from the current set of
achievable capabilities.
The impact of a successful exploit is reflective of the value of the threatened host.
We uniformly assigned each host an integer in [1, 100] to represent its value to an
organization. The impact of compromise of reaching a privilege level on a host is
a percentage of this asset value. The quantities [20%, 40%, 100%] are used as the
scaling factors for the three privilege levels {0, 1, 2}.
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5.4.2 Results
The discussion focuses on answering the two questions introduced in the beginning
of Section 5.4: does Fashion produce good configurations and does it do so in a
timely manner? Answering the first question is slightly delicate because our security
optimization is using Reach and Path instead of using Risk. Throughout this section
we only report on the security quality of the final configuration with respect to Risk.
The algorithm for computing Risk is too slow to use in the optimization model but
allows an effective check on the quality of the solution a posteriori. In all results
the functionality score is the normalized value of the delivered traffic: it considers
the total value of traffic delivered when α = 1 (corresponding to the optimization
considering only functionality) as a functionality score of 1 with the other functionality
scores normalized accordingly. Risk is normalized in a similar way and computes the
Risk value when α = 1 (no protections deployed) and uses this as the denominator
for other configurations. When α = 1 this corresponds to a baseline Risk for all
tradeoffs of the security model. This is because the β parameter and the cost of
countermeasures are not included in the model.
Does Fashion produce good configurations?
Section 5.2.4 argues that combining the two security models would produce better
configurations than having β = 0 or β = 1. This was confirmed in our experiments.
Setting β = 1 produced a meaningful tradeoff between functionality and security.
However, when we consider 0 < β < 1 in the Hybrid manner, solution quality improves
(e.g., α = .7 improves functionality without impacting security). In all analyzed
solutions, varying α with just the Path measure active (β = 0) produced solutions
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that varied Path but not the actual Risk (other than blocking the gateway).
Thus, the setting of β ∈ (0, 1) seems crucial, but the particular value within (0, 1)
does not seem to have a substantial effect on solution quality. This would be the case
if one model is primarily being used as a tie-breaker for the other model. However,
we cannot rule out that different settings of β would be preferable on different classes
of networks and attack graphs. For the remainder of the analysis, consider β = .5,
i.e., Path and Reach are equally weighted.
One can ask if Fashion produces solutions that trade off functionality and secu-
rity. As a reminder, we use whitelist and source routing so setting α = 1 corresponds
to the minimum risk that is achievable while routing all desirable flows (assuming
routing all flows is feasible within bandwidth constraints). Any further minimization
of risk necessitates decreasing functionality. Furthermore, since we consider an exter-
nal attacker, blocking all flows at the entry point is always the solution chosen when
functionality is not considered (optimizing only over risk). Thus, every instance has
functionality and risk of 0 when α = 0. We remove this point from all analysis and
consider α > 0.
Since Fashion is approximating Risk it is possible for a decrease in α to lead to
worse risk and functionality. However, in all of our experiments, risk and functionality
were both monotonic for steps of α of size .1.4 We consider 212 benchmarks of pod
size of 6, each having 54 hosts. Varying α for each benchmark we plot both the
functionality scores against α and also the risk scores against α. The functionality
and risk scores are normalized as previously stated. Figure 5.4 demonstrates the
probability mass functions over every instance solution varying α = .1 to α = 1 in
4We did observe small perturbations that violated monotonicity if one considered steps of α of
.01.
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Figure 5.4: Probability mass function of instances for normalized risk (left) and
normalized functionality (right). Start of bar represents min, widening at 10% and 25%
with a line at 50%, reducing width at 75% and 90%, stopping at the max for each α. In
all cases, risk is 0 when α = .1.
steps of .1.
Note that the functionality scores across all benchmarks are relatively stable for
α ≥ .1 while the risk scores vary significantly. Importantly, at every point on this
curve Fashion is computing and outputting a corresponding network configuration.
Note that in addition to considering what flows to include, the solution also describes
how to route flow in a way that respects (and load balances) switch capacity. Based
on visual inspection we classified our instances into three types of attack graphs.
Instances with the most area under the curve In such instances nodes with
exploits to serve as an endpoint in many of the desired flows. In one generated pod
4 attack graph, a node with an exploit was the end point for a flow from 11 of the 15
other hosts. “Disconnecting” this node from the network required sacrificing many
flows. This yields a sharp functionality vs. security tradeoff. Note such a graph can
occur in practice when many clients need to access a critical, vulnerable resource such
as a database.
Instances with the least area under the curve In such instances flows with high
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value are mostly distinct from exploitable nodes. In one instance with 98 total flows,
it is possible to achieve risk 0 by only blocking 15 flows. Such instances can be seen
as easy: the risky nodes are not crucial to functionality.
Instances with many tradeoffs In such instances exploitable hosts have a mean-
ingful but not overwhelming value of flow. In these cases, Fashion can mitigate risk
in two ways: by severing external connections to prevent an attacker from entering
the network, or by severing internal connections to prevent an attacker from moving
laterally through network.
To illustrate this scenario and the corresponding choices, we consider one pod 4
attack graph with four exploitable nodes. These four nodes are all involved in both
external and internal flows. Here the external flows were typically of higher value
than that of internal flows, making Fashion sacrifice the internal flows for the sake
of security at larger values of α. However as α decreases, external flows begin to be
blocked which allows for previously severed internal flows to be serviced once again,
as they are no longer needed to prevent lateral movement since the attacker cannot
necessarily enter the network through external gateways. Table 5.2 shows the balance
of external and internal flows blocked in this instance. In this instance, the larger
sets of blocked internal flows at smaller values of α were not supersets of smaller sets
of blocked internal flows seen at larger α values. This demonstrates an important
capability of Fashion: the ability to recognize defenses whose current marginal cost
(to functionality) exceeds their value (to security).
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α .9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 .3 .2 .1
External Flows Blocked 0 1 3 5 5 7 7 48 48
Internal Flows Blocked 3 11 11 15 15 23 23 0 0
Table 5.2: Number of external and internal flows blocked over varying values of α on
example instance.
pod 6 8 10 12
#flows per host 3 5 10 3 5 10 1 3 1
min 13 25 65 152 466 1069 1650 1540 1256
25% 16 38 120 195 700 1545 2399 1608 1469
50% 19 43 151 250 763 1921 2686 1733 1853
75% 23 53 201 309 896 2259 2845 1990 2212
max 87 289 2316 607 2787 2825 2979 2308 2977
average 22 57 205 263 863 1937 2576 1836 1940
Table 5.3: Solve Time in Seconds for Pod 6, 8, 10 and 12 Networks with Different Flows
Per Host with α = .7
Does Fashion produce configurations in a timely manner?
To verify the scalability of Fashion and its ability to react to short term events,
it is valuable to assess performance as a function of various input size parameters.
Experiments were done on Fat-tree networks with pod sizes 6, 8, 10, and 12. Table 5.3
shows the model solve times when scaling the number of flows per host. In this
experiment, the sizes of pods, number of flows as well as the number of exploits
per host were increased. Rows labelled 25%, 50% and 75% report the percentile
breakdown of the runtime for the instances considered. The columns vary the number
of pods (6 to 12) as well as the number of flows per hosts.
The key observation here is that both the number of hosts and flows contribute
significantly to the solve time. This is not surprising as the amount of hosts and flows
affect the sizes of both the network and the attack graph, resulting in a large increase
to the model size. We note that the average runtime does not always strictly increase
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in Table 5.3. This is likely due to a smaller number of pod 10 & 12 instances being
tested due to time constraints, contributing to higher variance among their reported
times.
Another trend we observed is that the number of exploits alone can cause a rise
in solve time, as it directly affects the size of the attack graph. Yet, the volume of
exploits does not have as dramatic impact as the number of hosts/flows.
These results show that for networks of up to 128 hosts affected by a substantial
number of flows and exploits, the framework produces optimal configurations within
3-7 minutes. Interestingly, Ingols et al. are able to scale to attack graphs with 40,000
hosts in a similar time period by introducing equivalence classes among hosts to re-
duce the size of the attack graph and achieve scalability [55]. Since the technique is
orthogonal, it can easily be applied in our case as well. Homer et al. [51] build proba-
bilistic attack graphs on networks with 100 hosts, their attack graph generation takes
between 1-46 minutes depending on the complexity of the exploit chains. Both prior
works generate attack graphs for static network configuration with no consideration
of the functionality problem at all.
Fashion’s response time (on networks of this scale) allows automated response to
short term events such as publication of a zero-day before a patch is available. In an
actual deployment, where the model must be solved repeatedly over time as inputs
slightly evolve, the runtime can be drastically reduced when resolving the model by
priming the optimization with the solution of the previous generation [100], [99].
100












Figure 5.5: Need for linerizable risk measurements. Risk calculation time for output of
Fashion on pod 8 instances using Python implementation of Wang et al.’s
algorithm [121]. Pod 8 instances correspond to 128 hosts and 81 switches.
Can Risk be directly used?
Figure 5.5 shows the time required to compute the actual Risk, with α = .7 and using
our Python implementation of the algorithm by Wang et al. [121] of the network
configuration output by Fashion. The instances considered use 128 hosts, with 12
to 250 vulnerabilities. Over this set of benchmarks, the computation time for the
risk values in a fixed configuration can reach 100 seconds for 250 exploits. The
time to evaluate the actual risk seems correlated to the number of exploits, and the
evaluation algorithms start to struggle even with a relatively small number (e.g., 50
exploits). The search space associated with this kind of problem is generally huge.
Using this algorithm specification of Risk would yield a highly non-linear formulation
which would likely be intractable. Reverting to an enumeration of configurations and
computing the risk a posteriori would be equally intractable. Linearization is essential
to deliver a responsive and practical framework to assist network administrators.
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5.5 Conclusion
Configuring Software Defined Networks to maximize the volume of customers data
flows to and from servers while respecting device and link capacities is a classic flow
optimization problem. Protecting such a network from adversaries attempting to
exploit vulnerabilities that plague specific devices and hosts is equally important
to address within organizations. Attack graphs are effective in modeling risk and
finding mitigations (defensive measures). Unfortunately, risk and functionality are
antagonistic objectives and optimizing one without caring for the other is unhelpful
as it will deliver extreme solutions that are impractical. This paper considers both
challenges in a holistic fashion and automatically computes new SDN configurations
for network devices in response to emergent changes in demand, component risk or
exploit discoveries. The Fashion framework models the customer demands, network
devices and link capacities. It also captures two notions of risk, Path and Reach under
an attack-dependency graph model within the overall optimization. The output from
Fashion includes routing decisions for SDN devices as well as firewall mitigation
decisions.
The paper demonstrates that Fashion can explore the trade-off between func-
tionality and risk. As stated, Fashion optimizes over both objectives but the model
can easily be converted into one where either security or functionality is a constraint
and the other objective is optimized. The average of Path and Reach is an effec-
tive linearizable stand in for a risk calculation that is prohibitive to compute on the
scale needed for a configuration search problem. Interestingly, the novel hybrid risk
model enables Fashion to overcome their respective weaknesses and produce better
solutions. From a practical angle, Fashion runs in matter of minutes on networks
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of reasonable size (613 devices) and demonstrates potential for scalability. Finally,
the empirical results indicate that the approximation adopted by Fashion does not
jeopardize key properties such as monotonicity of functionality vs. risk.
The Fashion framework delivers a first step towards handling both functionality
and risk for short-term response while producing consistent results with natural in-
terpretations. Future directions include addressing not only source-routing but also
destination routing within the network; handling scalability of the model size that
currently depends on the number of network edges as well as the number of data
flows; supporting a more varied set of controls beyond routing and blocking.
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